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AN ANTITRUST APPROACH TO 
CORPORATE FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS 
RONALD J. COLOMBO†
INTRODUCTION 
 
The scope and contours of religious liberty in the United 
States have never been entirely clear.  Some clarity was 
interjected in 1990 when the United States Supreme Court 
attempted to render a definitive interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause.1  The Court explained that the First 
Amendment does not grant the faithful an automatic exemption 
from laws of general applicability,2 but rather merely enables 
legislatures to promulgate accommodations within their 
discretion.3  The effect of this decision was, in part, short-lived, 
as it prompted Congress in 1993 to enact the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”)—a global exemption from all past and 
prospective federal legislation—that Americans could assert 
under appropriate circumstances.4  Although RFRA complicated 
the situation, it would be incorrect to accuse the statute of 
muddying the jurisprudential waters to the state they were in 
prior to 1990.5
 
† Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. I 
wish to thank Thomas Lambert and Stephen Smith for their helpful critiques of an 
earlier draft, and Steven Mare for his valuable research assistance. I also wish to 
thank my colleagues at the School of Law for providing me with an opportunity to 
present a draft of this paper before them, and for the feedback received therefrom. 
  More accurately, RFRA substituted a broader, 
legislative approach to religious liberty in place of a narrower, 
judicial approach to religious liberty. 
1 See generally Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
2 See id. at 878–80. 
3 See id. at 890. 
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). Although RFRA was not explicitly limited to 
federal legislation, it was subsequently curtailed by the Supreme Court decision in 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
5 Robert F. Drinan & Jennifer I. Huffman, The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act: A Legislative History, 10 J.L. & RELIG., 531, 532–33 (1993). 
FINAL_COLOMBO 9/13/2018  11:15 AM 
30 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:29   
In 2014, in a development unexpected by many, the Supreme 
Court held that RFRA’s broad religious liberty protections extend 
not only to private individuals, but to for-profit business 
corporations as well.6
Rising to the top of this list of fears is anxiety over the future 
of certain equality-based, statutory protections for consumers 
and employees.  More specifically, corporate free exercise rights 
are often seen as undermining our nation’s antidiscrimination 
laws, as well as regulations designed to ensure ready access to 
contraception.
  This has opened a Pandora’s Box of fears, 
as businesses are subject to a plethora of significant regulation 
that ordinary individuals are not. 
7
What also deserves to be taken seriously are the religious 
liberty protections contained in RFRA as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court.  At a minimum, RFRA gives rise to a set of 
statutorily created rights no less valuable, objectively speaking, 
than those created by our nation’s antidiscrimination and 
contraceptive access laws.
  These concerns deserve to be taken seriously. 
8  Moreover, given the historical 
interpretation and legislative history of the First Amendment, 
one would be on solid ground in arguing that RFRA indeed 
“restored” religious liberty rights as its name suggests, bestowing 
upon RFRA’s protections a weighty constitutional pedigree.9
 
6 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60 (2014). This 
was not unexpected by everyone, however. See, e.g., Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked 
Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 87–88 (2013). 
 
7 E.g., Leslie C. Griffin, Hobby Lobby: The Crafty Case That Threatens Women’s 
Rights and Religious Freedom, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 641, 678 (2015); see 
Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations and – and Among – Civil Rights: 
Separation, Tolerance, and Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 501 (2015); 
Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 
B.C. L. REV. 781, 786 (2007). In Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civ. Rights 
Comm’n, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari over the question: “Does the 
application of Colorado’s public accommodations law to compel a cake maker to 
design and make a cake that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about same-
sex marriage violate the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment?” Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 
OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-111 (last visited Mar. 21, 2018); see also, 
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. den., 
2016 WL 1545027 (Colo. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (U.S. June 26, 2017) 
(No. 16-111). 
8 Indeed, as Richard Garnett has eloquently argued, religious freedom is not 
properly juxtaposed against civil rights, but is most appropriately understood as 
another fundamental civil right itself. See Garnett, supra note 7, at 497. 
9 See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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Unfortunately, few commentators seem genuinely willing to 
take both sets of rights, those established or restored by RFRA, 
and those established to advance equality, seriously.  
Immediately apparent from any review of the literature or 
commentary on the subject is that two distinct sides have formed, 
with each possessing little understanding or empathy for the 
other.10
In a free market economy, businesses are expected, and 
indeed relied upon, to compete fiercely against one another.  
Such competition is generally deemed good for consumers and 
the economy as a whole.  This must be distinguished from 
competition that is deemed “unreasonable,” or in some cases 
“unfair,” an antitrust term of art that refers to undertakings that 
are injurious to consumer welfare in the long run if not in the 
short run as well.  The line between these two concepts, of 
reasonable and vigorous competition versus unreasonable and 
injurious competition, can be extremely fine.  Indeed, the very 
same conduct can be deemed reasonable versus unreasonable, or 
fair versus unfair, depending upon its attendant circumstances.  
Most significant among these circumstances is the concept of 
“market power.” 
  This article hopes to buck that trend, proceeding from 
the perspective that the worthiness of each set of rights demands 
a solution in which no one set predominates via the 
marginalization of the other, offering a path forward in which the 
law endeavors to balance these competing rights, rather than 
subjugate one set to another.  Such a path can be forged from the 
insights and wisdom of U.S. antitrust law.  For antitrust law 
struggles with a balancing act of its own: that of promoting 
vigorous competition on the one hand while prohibiting 
competition that is “unreasonable” or “unfair” on the other. 
Roughly, market power signifies a business firm’s ability to 
control the price of a given good or service, a power usually 
restricted by the dynamism of competition.11
 
10 There are a number of notable exceptions to this trend. See, e.g., Douglas 
Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious Liberty, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 231 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, & Zoe Robinson, eds. 
2016). 
  Under antitrust 
law, a firm with market power is subject to certain limitations on 
its conduct that a firm without market power is not.  This is 
because whether a given course of conduct would be injurious to 
11 See infra Part II.D. 
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consumer welfare oftentimes turns upon the economic dominance 
of the actor in question.  Thus, a firm lacking market power has a 
freer hand in competing against its rivals or potential rivals, 
than does, for example, a monopolist, the paradigmatic firm with 
market power. 
This Article suggests that antitrust law’s concept of market 
power could similarly be employed in balancing the free exercise 
rights of a corporation or any for-profit business venture against 
the rights of individuals.12  When a business enterprise seeks a 
religious liberty exemption from a rights-granting law, a major 
factor in assessing its claim should be the degree to which it 
wields market power in the relevant market.  If the business is a 
monopolist, and, a fortiori, wielding tremendous market power, 
its claim for a free exercise exemption should probably fail.  If, 
conversely, the business is but a minor marketplace participant, 
wielding little or no market power, its claim for a free exercise 
exemption, if meritorious, should usually succeed.  In practical 
terms, such an approach to religious liberty would allow 
corporate free exercise claims to prevail most typically in those 
situations in which consumers or employees had sufficient 
alternative choices to obtain the goods, services, or employment 
in question elsewhere.  Under such circumstances, the need for 
the government to protect the rights of consumers and employees 
regarding discrimination or contraceptive access is at its nadir.  
However, when consumers or employees lack sufficient 
alternative choices, and are beholden to a particular corporation 
because of that firm’s market power, the need for government 
protection of consumer and employee rights is at its zenith.  
Here, the equality-based rights of these individuals would 
typically trump the religious liberty rights of the corporation.13
 
12 This Article treats interchangeably all business organizations, ranging from 
the sole proprietor to the business corporation. Indeed, the expression employed, 
“corporate free exercise,” is intended to cover the religious liberty claims of all for-
profit enterprises. This decision was made in full recognition that strong arguments 
could be made in support of differentiating among religious liberty claims brought by 
sole proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations. See infra Part III.D. 
 
13 Others, most notably Robert Vischer, have previously asserted that in 
assessing religious liberty exemptions against third-party interests, the law ought to 
take into account the availability of other firms willing and capable of satisfying 
such interests. See ROBERT VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD 4–6, 
174–75 (2010). But to my knowledge, neither Dean Vischer nor any other 
commentator has attempted to ground this assertion upon the insights or principles 
of antitrust law. Richard Epstein has articulated a theory of antidiscrimination law 
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This Article shall proceed as follows in fleshing out the 
proposal set forth above: Part I will trace the development and 
present the current reach of corporate free exercise rights.  Part 
II will address United States antitrust law, providing first a 
summary of its background and general operation, and thereafter 
focusing upon the concept of market power and its role in 
antitrust jurisprudence.  Part III will use the concept of market 
power to construct a compromise approach to the problem of 
corporate free exercise rights. 
I. CORPORATE FREE EXERCISE 
The rise of corporate free exercise rights has served to graft 
one controversial phenomenon upon another controversial 
phenomenon.  Namely, corporate free exercise rights adjoin the 
hotly contested issue of corporate constitutional rights to the 
complicated question of the reach, intent, and meaning of the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.  This Part will briefly 
explore each phenomenon and their recent convergence. 
A. The Free Exercise Clause 
As is well known, the United States was colonized and 
founded, in no small part, by pilgrims looking for a land on which 
they could live out their faiths in peace and freedom.14
 
pursuant to which the “antidiscrimination norm” ought only apply to monopolies—
especially legal monopolies. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE 
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 79–80 (1992). In an essay, he more 
recently applied his thinking, in passing, to the religious liberty rights of businesses. 
See Richard Epstein, Freedom of Association and Antidiscrimination Law: An 
Imperfect Reconciliation, LIBERTY FORUM (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.libertylaw 
site.org/liberty-forum/freedom-of-association-and-antidiscrimination-law-an-
imperfect-reconciliation/ [hereinafter Epstein, Freedom of Association]. Although 
there is much from Professor Epstein’s scholarship that bears upon the present 
article, Professor Epstein does not use antitrust law, or antitrust principles 
generally, to help flesh out the proper contours of corporate religious liberty. Rather, 
drawing from natural law, common law, and economic principles, Professor Epstein 
makes the argument that outside some very narrow exceptions—essentially legal 
monopolies, as mentioned—modern antidiscrimination law does more harm than 
good. See EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 13, at 496–97. 
  Some,  
 
14 See, e.g., THOMAS A. BAILEY, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT 22–28 (2006); Brett G. 
Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217, 1230 (“The 
pursuit of religious liberty was one of the most powerful forces driving early settlers 
to the American continent and remained a powerful force at the time of the founding 
of the American republic.”). 
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such as Roger Williams in Rhode Island, founded communities 
with a degree of religious freedom simply unheard of for their 
time.15
It is also well known that in short order, some of the 
persecuted became persecutors themselves.
 
16  That is, those 
fleeing religious persecution in England frequently established 
settlements in America that, in turn, persecuted religious 
dissenters almost as vigorously.17
Marked by such beginnings, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the American experiment with religious liberty has long suffered 
from a certain lack of clarity.  The very text in which religious 
liberty was ultimately enshrined, that of the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, remains subject to vociferous 
debate over both intent and meaning.
 
18  The language is not 
pellucid and the historical record is arguably inconclusive.19  This 
spawned a religious liberty jurisprudence from which, as 
Professor Laurence Tribe remarked in 1988, it seems “impossible 
to divine a coherent set of principles to explain.”20
Two clauses of the First Amendment serve to safeguard 
religious liberty in the United States: the Establishment Clause 
and the Free Exercise Clause.  These laconic clauses are 
conjoined in the opening words of the Amendment:  “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
 
21
The Establishment Clause, at a minimum, prohibits the 
federal government from designating a particular religion as the 
country’s national faith.
 
22
 
15 See BAILEY, supra note 14, at 28. 
  Due to the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that the Establishment 
Clause prohibits state governments from adopting particular 
16 Id. at 26. 
17 See Michael P. Farris, Facing Facts: Only a Constitutional Amendment Can 
Guarantee Religious Freedom for All, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 689, 689 (1999). 
18 See Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then 
And Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1607–08. 
19 See Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1155–66 (2nd ed.  
1988). 
20 Id. at 1264. See also Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the 
Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 315–17 (1986). 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
22 See Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in 
Establishment Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489, 564 (2011). 
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faiths of their own as well.23  Although the Framers held 
divergent beliefs regarding religion and its role in society, a 
consensus seems to have existed among them that prohibition of 
an established church was essential “to protect the liberty of 
conscience of religious dissenters from the coercive power of 
government.”24
Whereas the Establishment Clause works indirectly to 
protect religious liberty, the Free Exercise Clause provides direct 
protection.  This portion of the First Amendment precludes the 
federal government and, after the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, state governments, from prohibiting the “free 
exercise” of religion.
 
25
To some scholars, “free exercise” was adopted for “the 
prevention and eradication of discrimination against unpopular 
religions and religionists.”
  The contours of what exactly constitutes 
the “free exercise” of religion have been the subject of 
considerable speculation and debate. 
26  Pursuant to this line of thought, the 
First Amendment does not provide protection against “facially 
neutral laws passed in the absence of overt religious hostility.”27
Most scholars, however, read the original intent of the 
Framers more broadly.  As they have explained, religious 
conscience was sacrosanct to the Framers and the First 
  
What the First Amendment prohibits are laws intended to 
regulate an individual’s religious beliefs qua religious beliefs and 
an individual’s religious conduct qua religious conduct. 
 
23 See Paulsen, supra note 20, at 316. 
24 Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 350 (2002). In our own times, many Western nations continue to 
maintain official, state-sponsored churches, including Norway (Lutheranism), Malta 
(Catholicism), and Greece (Greek Orthodoxy). See David M. Smolin, Exporting the 
First Amendment?: Evangelism, Proselytism, and the International Religious 
Freedom Act, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 685, 688 (2000-2001). None of these countries are 
known to be hotbeds of religious persecution. Nevertheless, the First Amendment’s 
Framers can be forgiven for conflating the establishment of religion with the 
suppression of conscience and religious liberty in light of Europe’s history, 
particularly England’s, around the time of America’s colonization. See J. M. 
ROBERTS, THE NEW PENGUIN HISTORY OF THE WORLD 552–61 (5th ed. 2007). 
25 See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 115, 117 (1992). 
26 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, 
Free Exercise, and the (Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 
1259 (2008). 
27 Id. at 1273. 
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Amendment was designed to robustly protect this conscience.28  
Since conscience manifests itself in both thought and deed, these 
scholars read the First Amendment as protecting religiously 
motivated conduct even if such conduct was not specifically 
targeted for circumscription on account of its religious nature.29  
Such protection manifests itself via the “compelling state 
interest” test.30  Under this test, religious claimants are entitled 
to a judicially crafted exemption from any law that substantially 
burdens their religious conduct unless: (1) the law furthers a 
compelling state interest and (2) the law’s formulation represents 
the least restrictive means by which the government can further 
its compelling interest to minimize any burden upon religious 
exercise.31
The intractable debate over the Free Exercise Clause’s 
proper interpretation has been fueled, in no small part, by a 
historical record and a legislative history that are not entirely 
clear.
 
32  Not surprisingly, this, in turn, contributed to a series of 
Supreme Court cases in which the Court’s reading of the Free 
Exercise Clause was difficult to discern.33
As referenced in the introduction, however, the Supreme 
Court tried to bring clarity to the issue in 1990 with its 5-4 ruling 
in Employment Division v. Smith.
 
34  In Smith, the Court 
attempted to definitively adopt a narrow approach to 
interpreting the Free Exercise Clause.  The Court held that, 
outside of a limited set of situations that implicated multiple 
constitutional freedoms, such as “hybrid” cases, the Free Exercise 
Clause does not provide protection against laws of general 
applicability that only infringe upon religious conduct by 
happenstance.35
 
28 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. Rev. 1409, 1449–66 (1990). See also Philip 
Hamburger, More is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 839 (2004). 
  Thus, ordinarily, a law of general applicability 
is as binding upon an individual whose religious conduct it 
29 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 856–57. 
30 See George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 863, 902 (1988). 
31 See id. 
32 See McConnell, supra note 28, at 1414, 1511–13; see also RONALD J. 
COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 140–43 (2015). 
33 See Tribe, supra note 19, at 1168–79, 1193–1201, 1202–04, 1253–75 
(discussing the Court’s free exercise precedent). 
34 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–879 (1990). 
35 See id. at 881–82. 
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infringes as upon any other individual.36  Put differently, the 
Court explicitly rejected the argument that the Free Exercise 
Clause requires the courts to subject any law that substantially 
burdens religious conduct to the compelling government interest 
test.37
The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict 
the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the 
citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities . . . .  To 
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of 
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to 
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
  In writing for the Court’s majority, Justice Scalia 
explained: 
38
Consequently, under the First Amendment, laws of general 
applicability are deemed enforceable if they can be defended via 
recourse to a “rational basis,” a low hurdle to clear, even as 
applied against individuals whose religious exercise is 
encroached upon by those laws.
 
39
B. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
 
An important component of the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Smith was its endorsement of legislative accommodations.40 
Although the Court did not interpret the First Amendment as 
requiring judicially crafted exemptions from laws of general 
applicability that burden religious conduct, it made clear that the 
First Amendment certainly permits legislatures and 
governmental entities to craft such exemptions and 
accommodations of their own.41
 
36 See id. at 882. 
  Taking up this invitation, in a  
 
 
37 See id. 
38 Id. at 879 (citations omitted). 
39 The Court in Smith did not expressly articulate the appropriate test against 
which laws of general applicability ought to be assessed, but subsequent courts and 
commentators have interpreted the Court as having applied the rational basis test. 
E.g., Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999) (“In Employment Division v. 
Smith, the Court analyzed a free exercise of religion claim under a rational basis 
test. Under this test, a rationally based, neutral law of general applicability does not 
violate the right to free exercise of religion even though the law incidentally burdens 
a particular religious belief or practice.”) (citations omitted). 
40 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
41 See id. 
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show of sweeping bipartisanship, Congress passed, and President 
Clinton signed into law, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”) in 1993.42
RFRA’s legislative history makes clear that this Act was no 
typical legislative accommodation.  Rather, it was a scathing 
indictment of the Smith decision, which Congress excoriated for 
misreading both the First Amendment and the Supreme Court’s 
own precedent: 
 
The Congress finds that— 
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of 
religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the 
First Amendment to the Constitution; 
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise 
as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise; 
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious 
exercise without compelling justification; 
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the 
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the 
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by 
laws neutral toward religion; and 
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal 
court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances 
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental 
interests.43
In its operative sections, RFRA spells out the compelling 
government interest test and its application as follows: 
  
(a) In general 
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise 
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) Exception 
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to 
the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
 
42 The House of Representatives passed RFRA unanimously and the Senate 
passed RFRA by a vote of 97-3. See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and 
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 160 
(1997). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1(a) (2012), quoted in Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked 
Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013). 
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(c) Judicial relief 
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in 
violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or 
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief 
against a government.  Standing to assert a claim or defense 
under this section shall be governed by the general rules of 
standing under article [sic] III of the Constitution.44
Congress’s findings, and the approach it adopted, were well 
founded.  As previously indicated, most scholars had long 
understood the Free Exercise Clause to protect religious conduct 
more robustly than did the majority opinion in Smith.
 
45
This Court over the years painstakingly has developed a 
consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of 
a state statute that burdens the free exercise of religion.  Such a 
statute may stand only if the law in general, and the State’s 
refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, are justified 
by a compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive 
means.
  Further, 
the Congressional report largely echoed the dissenting opinion of 
the four justices in Smith, who explained: 
46
Thus, as a result of RFRA, Americans are afforded a broad 
measure of religious liberty rights, but as a matter of legislative 
largesse—not out of some clear constitutional imperative.  An 
individual whose exercise of religion is substantially burdened by 
government may seek an exemption from the government’s 
action, and that exemption is to be granted unless the 
government can demonstrate a compelling interest pursued via 
the least restrictive means.  This protection is not mandated by 
the Free Exercise Clause, but rather by Congress as per the 
requirements of RFRA. 
 
 
44 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
45 See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. Part of the confusion inherent 
in the Court’s pre-Smith case law was its practice of articulating a standard of 
“strict scrutiny” with regard to laws that infringed upon religious exercise while 
applying a standard that, in fact, was not very strict. See Abner S. Greene, Religious 
Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties: Is There a Middle Ground? 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 161, 176 (2015). Consequently, it has been said that RFRA did not “restore” 
religious liberty to its pre-Smith status quo, but rather implemented a significantly 
more protective approach. See id. at 178 (“. . . RFRA did not just restore the kind of 
weak strict scrutiny that prevailed pre-Smith. It ushered in a regime that is more 
protective of religious freedom . . . .”). 
46 Smith, 494 U.S. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), quoted in Colombo, supra 
note 43, at 40. 
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RFRA’s constitutionality was eventually challenged, and the 
legislation was upheld as applied to the federal government and 
federal law,47 but struck down as applied to state governments 
and state laws.48  This, in turn, prompted several states to pass 
RFRAs of their own.49  As of this writing, 20 states have passed 
such laws, and most are closely modeled on the federal version.50
Recall that even post-Smith, however, the Free Exercise 
Clause continues to protect against the intentional 
circumscription or regulation of religious belief or behavior on 
account of its religious nature,
  
When this development is added to the mix, we have a regime in 
which religious liberty is robustly protected against federal 
encroachment, but which enjoys no equivalent protection 
uniformly at the state level. 
51 and as such state governments 
are forbidden from engaging in anything of that sort to the same 
extent as the federal government.  But with regard to laws of 
general applicability, the states are for the most part not 
restrained by the Free Exercise Clause.52
C. Corporate Assertions of Free Exercise Rights 
  The only protections 
that individuals have against state laws that substantially 
burden their religious exercise would be those contained in their 
state constitution or promulgated under state law, including the 
aforementioned state RFRA statutes. 
In retrospect, corporate assertions of free exercise rights 
were inevitable.  The rise of an increasingly aggressive 
regulatory state, coupled with ever-greater religious diversity 
among Americans, was bound to generate conflict between the 
 
47 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418, 439 (2006). 
48 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511, 536 (1997). 
49 See National Conference of State Legislatures: State Religious Freedom 
Restoration Acts, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-
statutes.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2018). 
50 See id. 
51 See supra text accompanying notes 27 and 34–35. 
52 The language used here is qualified because of the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of strict scrutiny in the face of “hybrid” cases and in situations where a 
law recognizes various non-religiously based exemptions but no religiously based 
exemptions. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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laws of the land and the religious scruples of some segments of 
the population.53
That these conflicts have bubbled over into the realm of 
business enterprises should, likewise, not be surprising given the 
nature of modern-day business regulation.  As I have explained 
elsewhere: 
 
[B]usiness regulation over the past few decades has taken on a 
more value-laden, and a less specifically economic character.  
Whereas early twentieth-century business regulation focused on 
issues such as minimum wage and child labor, late twentieth-
century business regulation has addressed issues of civil rights 
and discrimination.  As it opens, the twenty-first century has 
continued along this trajectory, witnessing demands that 
employers provide equal benefits to same-sex couples and that 
employers offer health insurance plans that cover such things 
as contraceptives, abortifacients, and sterilization.  This serves 
to increase conflict, as the values animating some of this 
modern regulation and the values driving religiously inspired 
businesses can diverge in ways that are less likely when dealing 
with purely economic regulation.54
More surprising than the mere assertion of corporate 
religious liberty claims was the validation of such claims by the 
Supreme Court in the 2014 case, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc.
 
55
At the risk of indulging in semantics, it ought to be 
acknowledged that there really is nothing particularly novel or 
controversial about “corporate religious liberty” per se.  
Charitable organizations, religious institutions, and even 
churches and congregations are frequently organized as nonprofit 
corporations, but are corporations nonetheless.
  Before delving into the substance of Burwell, however, it is 
important to discuss why that case’s outcome should not have 
been so wholly unanticipated. 
56  That such 
corporate entities have standing to assert religious liberty 
claims—first under the Free Exercise Clause and, in more recent 
times under RFRA—has been firmly established.57
 
53 See Garnett, supra note 7, at 498. 
 
54 See Colombo, supra note 43, at 25 (citations omitted). 
55 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60 (2014). 
56 See Bruce B. Jackson, Secularization by Incorporation: Religious 
Organizations and Corporate Identity, 11 FIRST AMEND. L REV. 90, 95 (2012). 
57 See Thad Eagles, Note, Free Exercise, Inc.: A New Framework for 
Adjudicating Corporate Religious Liberty Claims, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 597–98 
FINAL_COLOMBO 9/13/2018  11:15 AM 
42 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:29   
Additionally, it has also been firmly established that 
engagement in for-profit activity does not bar a claimant from 
asserting his, her, or its religious liberty rights.  In Braunfeld v. 
Brown, the Supreme Court recognized the rightful assertion of 
Free Exercise rights by a group of “merchants” who objected to 
Sunday closing laws due to the effect that such laws had upon 
their businesses.58  Likewise, in United States v. Lee, the Court 
acknowledged that a sole proprietor had standing to challenge 
the social security tax levied upon his businesses, a farm and 
carpentry shop, on Free Exercise grounds.59  Although claimants 
in these two cases ultimately did not prevail upon their Free 
Exercise claims, their failure was on the merits.60
But if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law 
within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance 
the State’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect 
burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish 
its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.
  In other 
words, the Court did not challenge the propriety of claimants’ 
Free Exercise arguments, but rather accepted their propriety and 
proceeded to review the challenged laws under the requisite 
standards for adjudicating free exercise claims.  Thus in 
Braunfeld, the merchants’ claims were unsuccessful because the 
law in question did not substantially burden religious exercise 
and could not be more narrowly tailored according to the Court: 
61
Similarly, in Lee, the Court grappled seriously with the 
claimant’s assertion that the social security tax conflicted with 
his Amish faith, but reiterated the rule that the state may 
nevertheless “justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing 
that it is essential to accomplish an overriding government 
interest.”
 
62
 
(2015) (“The [Supreme] Court . . . held on multiple occasions that government action 
violated the free exercise and RFRA rights of incorporated churches, and heard 
challenges from incorporated churches that failed for other reasons. The corporate 
form alone, therefore, could not prohibit religious liberty protection.”) (citations 
omitted); see also Colombo, supra note 6, at 71. 
  In rendering its decision, the Court never questioned 
58 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601, 606 (1961). 
59 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254, 256 (1982). 
60 See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608–09; see also Lee, 455 U.S. at 258–59. 
61 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607. As can be seen, some interpretive liberty was 
taken in the presentation of the Court’s holding here, translating “indirect burden” 
as “insubstantial burden” and “by means which do not impose such a burden” as 
“narrowly tailored.” Id.  
62 Lee, 455 U.S. at 257. 
FINAL_COLOMBO 9/13/2018  11:15 AM 
2018] AN ANTITRUST APPROACH TO FREE EXERCISE 43 
the appropriateness of applying the Free Exercise Clause to the 
situation at hand, but rather ruled in favor of the government 
“[b]ecause the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax 
system is of such a high order.”63
Although both Braunfeld and Lee were decided before the 
Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 
the cases remain good law.  Recall that Smith expressly upheld 
its existing First Amendment precedent, including the earlier 
cases, Lee and Braunfeld.
 
64
As discussed, following Smith, it is RFRA, and not the First 
Amendment, that provides the lion’s share of protection for 
religious practices that are impeded by federal laws of general 
applicability.
 
65  This has led some, including the Department of 
Justice during the Obama Administration, to take the 
implausible position that RFRA actually narrows the scope of 
protected religious activity post-Smith.66  The position is 
implausible in light of RFRA’s language and legislative history, 
recounted earlier.67  Recall that RFRA was ostensibly passed to 
“restore” the protections of religious liberty as many understood 
them to be prior to the Smith decision.68  The only serious debate 
over RFRA’s effect is whether it truly restored the pre-Smith 
state of affairs versus whether it actually bolstered the level of 
protection afforded to religious exercise in America.69  Although 
discerning Congressional intent can oftentimes be difficult, here 
the record is clear that RFRA was intended to reverse the 
Employment Division v. Smith decision and to provide for or 
restore a robust approach to free exercise rights.70
RFRA’s very text similarly evinces a vigorous approach to 
religious liberty, on par with the Act’s legislative intent.  Critics 
to corporate religious liberty argue that RFRA’s reference to a 
“person’s exercise of religion” excludes its extension to for-profit 
 
 
63 Id. at 260. 
64 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–80 (1990). 
65 See supra Part I.B. 
66 See Terri R. Day et al., A Primer on Hobby Lobby: For-Profit Corporate 
Entities’ Challenge to the HHS Mandate, Free Exercise Rights, RFRA’s Scope, and 
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 55, 74 (2014). 
67 See supra Part I.B. 
68 See Greene, supra note 45 at 178.  
69 Id. 
70 See supra Part I.B. 
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corporations.71  As per the Dictionary Act, however, it is a matter 
of fundamental statutory interpretation to interpret the word 
“person” to “include corporations, companies, associations, firms, 
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals.”72  This would appear to settle the matter, but for 
the Dictionary Act’s admonishment that its definitions do not 
apply if “the context indicates otherwise.”73
As would be expected, the opponents of corporate free 
exercise argue that RFRA’s context does not support defining its 
reference to “person” to encompass for-profit corporations.
 
74  Both 
proponents and opponents of corporate free exercise reference 
Supreme Court precedent in support of their position.75  This is 
enabled by the fact that, (1) on the one hand, the Court had 
permitted “merchants” and other for-profit actors to assert Free 
Exercise Claims against laws impacting their commercial 
activity,76 while (2) on the other hand, the Court had never 
expressly held that a for-profit corporation could assert such 
claims.77
Further muddying the jurisprudential waters, or, from 
another perspective, tipping the balance, is the fact that there is 
near “universal acceptance that RFRA’s use of the word ‘persons’ 
included nonprofit corporations.”
 
78
 
  This could be interpreted as 
suggesting the irrelevance of the corporate form to the question 
of Free Exercise and RFRA religious rights.  Put differently, the 
Free Exercise Clause and, subsequently, RFRA covers all 
individuals and entities engaged in religious exercise, whether 
incorporated or unincorporated. 
 
71 See Day, supra note 66, at 73–74. 
72 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
73 Id. 
74 See John Duke, Religious Freedom and the Little Corporation That Could: 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 34 MISS. C. L. REV. 89, 95 (2015). 
75 See Maria Iliadis, An Easy Pill to Swallow, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 341, 354 
(2015); Marc A. Greendorfer, Blurring the Lines Between Churches and Secular 
Corporations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 855 (2015). 
76 See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. 
77 See Seema Mohapatra, Time to Lift the Veil of Inequality in Health-Care 
Coverage: Using Corporate Law to Defend the Affordable Care Act, 50 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 137, 149 (2015). 
78 See Elizabeth Sepper, Gendering Corporate Conscience, 38 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 193, 196 (2015). 
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Conversely, the Court’s past recognition of the Free Exercise 
Clause’s applicability to nonprofit corporations could be read as 
underscoring the exclusion of for-profit corporations from the 
Clause’s umbrella of protection.  This argument borrows from the 
logic of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius—the time-honored 
maxim that the explicit inclusion of one thing should be 
interpreted as intending the exclusion of another.79
Inclusio unius, however, is a poor fit for this situation.  The 
maxim applies to the interpretation of contracts
  In other 
words, by extending the Free Exercise Clause’s protections to 
nonprofit corporations, and only to nonprofit corporations, the 
Supreme Court had arguably drawn a line in the sand 
distinguishing nonprofit corporations from other corporate 
entities.  Consequently, this is purportedly the precedent that 
RFRA intended to restore.  A fortiori, RFRA’s reference to 
“persons” does not go beyond the list of entities previously 
recognized by the Supreme Court as entitled to assert Free 
Exercise claims. 
80 and statutes,81 
not to Supreme Court opinions.82
 
79 See Eric Engle, Legal Interpretation by Computer: A Survey of Interpretive 
Rules, 5 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 71, 77 (2011). 
  And for good reason.  Unlike 
the drafter of a contract or piece of legislation, Supreme Court 
justices are limited by the parties and issues before the Court.  
Thus, a fairer interpretation of the Court’s traditional silence on 
the issue of for-profit corporations and the Free Exercise Clause 
would be to simply observe that, heretofore, the Court had not 
been given an opportunity to squarely address the issue. The 
Supreme Court explicitly disclaimed any resolution of the above-
referenced controversies in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, proffering a  
 
 
80 See Patrick S. Ottinger, Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 60 LA. L. 
REV. 765, 786 (2000). 
81 See Patrick O’Leary, Moreau v. Harris County: The Fifth Circuit Determines 
That the Fair Labor Standards Act Does Not Prohibit Public Employers From 
Mandating the Use of Accrued Compensatory Time, 73 TUL. L. REV. 2171, 2176 
(1999). 
82 Cf. Jerry Buchmeyer, Louisiana Law – Legends and Laughs, 67 TEX. B. J. 
815, 816 (2004) (“A case was being argued to a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel 
that included the legendary John Minor Wisdom. Judge Wisdom asked counsel, a 
well-known lawyer from Midland, ‘Counsel, are you familiar with the maxim 
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius?’ Without hesitation, counsel responded 
sanctimoniously, ‘Your Honor, in Midland they speak of little else.’ ”). 
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decision that was intentionally narrower in scope.  Upon closer 
inspection, however, the Burwell decision is not as limited as it 
might superficially appear to be. 
 In Burwell, the Supreme Court consolidated two cases 
challenging certain regulations promulgated by the Department 
of Health and Human Services following passage of the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).83  The regulations in question were 
those pertaining to the ACA’s “contraceptive mandate,” pursuant 
to which “specified employees’ group health plans . . . [were] 
required to provide coverage for the 20 contraceptive methods 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration, including the 4 
that may have the effect of preventing an already fertilized egg 
from developing any further by inhibiting its attachment to the 
uterus.”84  Claimants considered it immoral, and contrary to their 
religious beliefs, to facilitate the intentional destruction of a 
human embryo by providing all of the federally mandated 
insurance coverage.85  In greater detail, claimants contended that 
obedience to the contraceptive mandate would make them 
complicit in a grave moral evil.86  Asserting, therefore, that the 
contraceptive mandate “imposes a substantial burden” on their 
ability to “conduct business in accordance with their religious 
beliefs,”87 the claimants sought an exemption therefrom under 
either the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA.88
The two cases coming before the Supreme Court also gave 
rise to a circuit split:  In Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. 
Burwell, the Third Circuit denied claimant’s request for a 
religious liberty exemption,
 
89 whereas in Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc. v. Sebelius, the Tenth Circuit granted it.90
 
83 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
  In so doing, the 
Third Circuit held that a for-profit, secular corporation could  
 
84 Id. at 2754. 
85 See id. at 2778. 
86 See Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based 
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2516 (2015). 
87 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778 (emphasis omitted). 
88 See id. at 2755. 
89 See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 724 F.3d 377, 417 (3d Cir. 
2013) (reversed sub nom. Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751). 
90 See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1191 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(en banc). 
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assert neither a Free Exercise Clause nor a RFRA claim,91 
whereas the Tenth Circuit held that a for-profit corporation could 
assert both a Free Exercise Clause and a RFRA claim.92
The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the claimants, 
granting them the exemption sought, thereby reversing the Third 
Circuit’s holding and affirming the Tenth Circuit’s.
 
93  But 
whereas the circuit courts ruled upon the Free Exercise and 
RFRA claims in concert, the Supreme Court did not.  The 
Supreme Court explicitly ruled only upon claimants’ RFRA 
claims, and passed on deciding upon the Free Exercise Clause’s 
applicability.94
The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held 
corporations, violates RFRA.  Our decision on that statutory 
question makes it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment 
claim raised by [claimants].
  In its own words: 
95
In order to determine whether RFRA’s reference to “person” 
included for-profit corporations, the Court turned to the 
Dictionary Act.
 
96  As discussed, the Dictionary Act explicitly 
includes for-profit corporations in its definition of “person,” and 
as such the only issue is whether the context of the legislation 
under examination requires an alternative interpretation of the 
term.97
In its assessment of RFRA, the Court made two interrelated 
observations.  First, the Court noted that RFRA should not be 
read as “merely restor[ing] this Court’s pre-Smith decisions in 
ossified form.”
  Thus, the Dictionary Act required the Court to assess 
RFRA’s context for evidence of a definition of “person” that would 
exclude business corporations. 
98  The Court explained that the results would be 
“absurd” if RFRA were to be read as “not allow[ing] a plaintiff to 
raise a RFRA claim unless that plaintiff fell within a category of 
plaintiffs one of whom had brought a free-exercise claim that this 
Court entertained in the years before Smith.”99
 
91 See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 388. 
 
92 See Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 723 F.3d at 1135–37. 
93 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751. 
94 See id. at 2785. 
95 Id. 
96 See id. at 2768. 
97 See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
98  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2773. 
99 Id. 
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Second, the Court observed that “Congress enacted RFRA in 
1993 to provide very broad protection for religious liberty”—even 
more protection than that which existed prior to Smith.100  For 
whereas, according to the Court, a “balancing test” was applied to 
Free Exercise challenges to laws of general applicability pre-
Smith, RFRA replaced that test with the much more stringent 
“least restrictive means” standard.101
Taken together, these observations led the Court to conclude 
that “nothing in RFRA . . . suggests a congressional intent to 
depart from the Dictionary Act definition.”
 
102  As such, the 
Court’s majority in Burwell held that RFRA’s protections 
embraced for-profit corporate claimants.103
Although Burwell answered the question of corporate 
religious liberty rights with respect to RFRA (in the affirmative), 
it left unanswered the question with respect to the First 
Amendment.  By bifurcating the RFRA and Free Exercise Clause 
analysis, and by eschewing any explicit holding on the latter, the 
Court failed to provide a clear articulation of the Free Exercise 
Clause’s reach. 
 
Temporarily, at least, this is not particularly problematic.  
As indicated previously, when it comes to religious liberty claims 
against federal action, RFRA, and not the First Amendment, 
does the heavy lifting post-Smith.104  Nevertheless, to the extent 
that the Free Exercise Clause itself might be implicated in a 
corporate religious liberty dispute, the First Amendment 
implications of Burwell should not go unnoticed.105
 
100 Id. at 2760. 
  For although  
 
 
101 Id. at 2760−61. The Court’s reference to its pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence as having employed a “balancing test” apparently recognizes 
something that commentators have noted: The Court’s purported application of 
“strict scrutiny” toward government action infringing religious liberty was strict in 
name only. See Greene, supra note 45, at 163, 177. 
102 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
103 See id. at 2785. 
104 See supra text accompanying note 65. 
105 Although RFRA is inapplicable to state law and state governments, the Free 
Exercise Clause is not so restricted. As such, state action that would run afoul the 
narrow protections of the Free Exercise Clause—as understood post-Smith—could 
still potentially be challenged by a business corporation. Whether the corporation 
would be able to press ahead with its challenge would turn, in part, upon our 
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause’s reach. 
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Burwell ostensibly left the question of the Free Exercise Clause’s 
applicability to for-profit business corporations unresolved, it 
nevertheless provided some rather clear guidance. 
As mentioned, in its assessment of RFRA’s context, the 
Court found no justification for deviating from the Dictionary 
Act’s definition of “person.”106  This conclusion was made easy by 
the dual observations that (1) RFRA should not be read as 
restoring religious liberty precedent pre-Smith in an “ossified” 
form and, moreover, (2) RFRA superimposed a regime of religious 
liberty even more robust than that which existed prior to 
Smith.107
Particularly telling is the Court’s comment and discussion 
about an “ossified” Free Exercise jurisprudence.
  A fair amount can be gleaned from this. 
108  Here the 
Court makes clear that the “category of plaintiffs” which had 
previously been recognized as potential Free Exercise Clause 
claimants is not fixed to those recognized prior to Smith, but 
remains subject to further expansion.109
Further, in the Court’s review of its precedent, Justice Alito 
makes the same observations made previously here and 
elsewhere: the Supreme Court has long recognized the Free 
Exercise Clause’s applicability to unincorporated for-profit 
businesses, along with its applicability to nonprofit 
corporations.
  Thus, the failure of 
having previously recognized a for-profit corporate Free Exercise 
claimant should not preclude the recognition of one in the future.  
That possibility remains open. 
110
With regard to the point that RFRA superimposed a more 
robust regime of religious liberty than that which had existed 
prior to Smith,
  All of this strongly suggests that, although 
decided as a matter of statutory, namely, RFRA, rather than 
constitutional interpretation, Burwell reflects a belief on the part 
of the Court that the Free Exercise Clause does indeed 
encompass for-profit corporate claimants. 
111
 
106 See supra notes 96–103 and accompanying text. 
 this does not, upon close inspection, affect our 
analysis of for-profit, corporate Free Exercise standing.  For a 
careful reading of RFRA’s text and history reveals that its 
107 Id. 
108 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2773. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. at 2769−2773. 
111 See id. at 2760. 
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robustness goes to the strength of its religious liberty protections, 
not the scope of those protections.  The backlash sparked by 
Smith was centered entirely on the Supreme Court’s use of the 
“rational basis test” for laws of general applicability in place of 
the “compelling government interest” or “least restrictive means” 
tests.112
Finally, it should be noted that in Burwell the Court 
indicated a concern over third-party harms flowing from the 
requested accommodation.
  It was not over any question pertaining to who can 
rightfully claim the protections of the Free Exercise Clause.  
Thus, Burwell should not be read as extending religious liberty 
protections to for-profit corporations only because of RFRA’s 
enactment.  Rather, Burwell is best read as reflecting the Court’s 
view that (1) the “free exercise of religion,” as that term is 
understood under RFRA and, apparently, the First Amendment 
as well, can encompass the conduct of for-profit corporations, and 
(2) the test to be applied to the alleged infringement of the free 
exercise of religion by federal laws of general applicability is the 
compelling government interest or least restrictive means test as 
set forth in RFRA. 
113  For although the Court ruled in 
favor of granting an accommodation, it arguably did so only after 
assuring itself that the effect of the accommodation on third 
parties “would be precisely zero.”114  And this should not be 
surprising, as “[t]he analysis of free exercise claims has always 
taken harm to third parties into account.”115  A perennial, 
unanswered question has been, however, “what counts as 
harm”?116  Unfortunately, the Court in Burwell did not shed 
much light on this issue, as it did “not examine the kinds of harm 
that accommodation of complicity-based conscience claims might 
inflict,” nor did the Court “offer guidance about how principles 
concerned with third-party harm might apply in future cases.”117
 
112 See Miller, 176 F.3d at 1206. 
  
As we shall see, among other things, employing an antitrust 
113 See Nejaime and Siegel, supra note 86, at 2531. 
114 Id. (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760). See also id. at 2580 (“ ‘courts 
must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose 
on nonbeneficiaries’ ”) (quoting 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37). 
115 See Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom? 123 YALE L.J. 
770, 803 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). 
116 Id. 
117 Nejaime and Siegel, supra note 86, at 2532. 
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approach to corporate free exercise exemptions and 
accommodations would help address these concerns.118
II. U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 
 
This article contends that concepts borrowed from U.S. 
antitrust law can be used to help navigate the turbulent waters 
of for-profit free-exercise rights.  More specifically, this Article 
suggests that antitrust’s focus on market power holds the key to 
best reconciling the conflicting rights of third parties and 
religiously expressive for-profit business actors.  After briefly 
setting forth some general background information on U.S. 
antitrust law, this part will examine the concept of market 
power. 
A. Background 
Known as “competition law” in most of the world,119 U.S. 
federal antitrust law was brought into being by the Sherman Act 
in 1890.120  Before that time, in the United States antitrust law 
was—like most other fields of law—a matter left to the states.121  
At the state level, its precepts and prohibitions were largely 
derived from common law rules regarding restraint of trade.122
By the late Nineteenth Century, however, it had become 
clear that the “trusts”
 
123 were beyond the ability of individual 
states to regulate.124
 
118 Although many courts and commentators have used the terms 
interchangeably, best practice is to use “exemptions” to refer to judicially crafted 
relief from laws of general applicability on the basis of religious objection and 
“accommodations” to refer to relief that is legislatively crafted. 
  Hence Congress’s intervention in 1890. 
119 E.g., David J. Gerber, Europe and the Globalization of Antitrust Law, 14 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 15, 16–23 (1999). 
120 See Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of 
Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 657, 667–69 (1993). 
121 See id. at 658. 
122 See id. 
123 “Trust,” within this context, is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as: “An 
association or organization of persons or corporations having the intention and 
power, or the tendency, to create a monopoly, control production, interfere with the 
free course of trade or transportation, or to fix and regulate the supply and price of 
commodities.” Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
124 See Gavil, supra note 120, at 658 (“With the ability to structure and 
restructure their conduct around states whose laws and law enforcers proved hostile, 
the trusts could evade attempts at condemnation and remedial restructuring with 
relative ease at the state level.”). 
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Although the precise contours of the Congressional intent 
undergirding the Act’s passage remain a subject of debate,125
Controversies continue to rage after more than a century of 
Sherman Act enforcement, but one thing should be settled: “the 
policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.”  With 
the Sherman Act, Congress “sought to establish a regime of 
competition as the fundamental principle governing commerce 
in this country.”  The statutory scheme is to “safeguard 
consumers by protecting the competitive process.”  “The 
Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately 
competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better 
goods and services,” and the Act “precludes inquiry into the 
question whether competition is good or bad” in particular 
circumstances.
 
broad agreement has been reached over a number of essential 
items.  As one commentator explained after surveying Supreme 
Court antitrust precedent: 
126
One of the hallmarks of U.S. antitrust law, and particularly 
the Sherman Act, is its reliance on the judiciary for an 
articulation of its details.  Indeed, it is not hyperbole to say that 
Congress entrusted to the judiciary a significant role in the 
setting of antitrust policy itself.
 
127
Sherman Act, Section 1 
  Both Section 1 and Section 2 
of the Act, which contain its laboring oars, read as follows in 
their current manifestations: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.  Every 
person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, 
if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the 
discretion of the court.128
 
125 See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Bork’s “Legislative Intent” and the Courts, 79 
ANTITRUST L.J. 941, 947–49 (2014). 
 
126 See Gregory J. Werden, Competition, Consumer Welfare, & the Sherman Act, 
9 SEDONA CONF. J. 87, 87 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 
127 See David F. Shores, Antitrust Decisions and Legislative Intent, 66 MO. L. 
REV. 725, 740 (2001); Daniel J. Gifford, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. 
REV. 1677, 1678−80 (1995). 
128 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
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Sherman Act, Section 2 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, 
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of 
a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine 
not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other 
person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, 
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.129
Congress left it to the courts to define the critical terms 
“restraint of trade” and “monopolize” as used in Sections 1 and 2 
of the Act,
 
130 thereby inviting an evolving, judicially crafted 
approach to federal antitrust law.  Accepting the invitation, the 
courts adopted an approach pursuant to which the Sherman Act 
was essentially deemed to prohibit “unreasonable” business 
practices—unreasonable restraints of trade under Section 1, and 
unreasonably exclusionary conduct under Section 2.131
That said, Congress did not completely depend upon the 
judiciary to effectuate its vision of antitrust policy,
 
132 especially 
after the Supreme Court’s 1911 decisions in Standard Oil Co. of 
New Jersey v. United States and United States v. American 
Tobacco Co.133  Members of Congress were of the opinion that the 
Sherman Act needed to be strengthened in light of the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of it in those two landmark cases.134  This 
ultimately led to the passage of the Clayton Act and the Federal 
Trade Commission Act in 1914.135
 
129 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
  Although the legislative 
histories of these acts are “lengthy, complex, and at time 
cacophonous,” it can confidently be said that these acts sought to 
strengthen the Sherman Act by providing clearer protections for  
 
130 See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antirust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
1051, 1060 (1979). 
131 See Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 
B.C. L. REV. 871, 875−76 (2011). 
132 See Thomas J. Horton, Fixing Merger Litigation “Fixes”: Reforming the 
Litigation of Proposed Merger Remedies Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 55 S.D. 
L. REV. 165, 187 (2010). 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. at 189. 
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consumers and small firms against the “unfair use” of monopoly 
power.136
F.T.C. Act, Section 5 
  Of most relevance to our inquiry is section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, which reads in full as follows: 
Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and 
unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting commerce, are 
hereby declared unlawful.137
The most critical feature of the FTC Act is its creation of the 
Federal Trade Commission, a new federal agency empowered 
with authority to “administer” federal antitrust law.
  
138  The 
operative language of Section 5, set forth above, has, over time, 
“been held coterminous with the Sherman and Clayton Acts.”139
It used to be thought that “unfair methods of competition” swept 
further than the practices forbidden by the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts, and you find this point repeated occasionally even 
today, but it is no longer tenable.  The Sherman and Clayton 
Acts have been interpreted so broadly that they no longer 
contain gaps that a broad interpretation of Section 5 of the FTC 
Act might be needed to fill.  There are business torts, such as 
disparagement and trademark infringement, that do not rise to 
the level of antitrust violations yet distort competition and are 
“unfair” (indeed trademark law is often referred to as “unfair 
competition” law), but I have not heard it suggested that the 
existing remedies for these practices are inadequate.
  
As Richard Posner has explained: 
140
Whereas the Sherman Act already effectively prohibited 
unfair methods of competition—using its bar on unreasonable 
conduct—the Sherman Act “does not become effective until a 
 
 
136 Id. at 187. 
137 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
138 See Horton, supra note 132, at 188; see also F.M. Scherer, Sunlight and 
Sunset at the Federal Trade Commission, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 461, 467 (1990) 
(identifying as “the most important” feature of the FTC Act as the creation of an 
agency with “the power of preventing in their conception and in their beginning 
some of [the] unfair processes in competition which have been the chief courses of 
monopoly”) (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 14,941 (1914)). 
139 WILLIAM HOLMES AND MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 
§ 7:2 (2015). 
140 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 761, 766 (2005). But see Thomas Dahdouh, Section 5, the FTC and 
its Critics: Just Who Are the Radicals Here?, 20 No. 2 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & 
UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 1, 7 (2011). 
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monopoly is full grown.”141  By contrast, Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
coupled with the creation of the FTC, “ ‘is aimed to nip those 
practices in the bud’ in order to protect competitors from unfair 
methods of competition before a monopoly has been achieved or is 
dangerously close to being achieved.”142
B. The Tensions of Antitrust 
 
As explained by Philip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkemp: 
the principle objective of antitrust policy is to maximize 
consumer welfare by encouraging firms to behave competitively 
while yet permitting them to take advantage of every available 
economy that comes from . . . efficiencies.143
This apparently straight-forward objective is fraught with 
significant tensions and difficulties.  First, is competition and the 
maximization of consumer welfare best measured by the total 
number of marketplace participants (competitors), or rather by 
efficiencies of scale achieved via size, integration, and/or inter-
firm cooperation?
   
144  And, in our efforts to protect competition, 
ought the law protect competitors from one another?145
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects.  But 
we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote 
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally 
owned businesses.  Congress appreciated that occasional higher 
costs and prices might result from the maintenance of 
fragmented industries and markets.  It resolved these 
competing considerations in favor of decentralization.  We must 
give effect to that decision.
  With 
regard to this latter point, the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe 
explicitly recognized the tension and difficulties involved: 
146
 
 
 
 
 
141 William Kolasky, George Rublee and the Origins of the Federal Trade 
Commission, 26 ANTITRUST 106, 109 (2011) (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 12,146 (1914)). 
142 Id. (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 12,146 (1914)). 
143 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 100a, 4 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
144 See Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 814−15 (2004). 
145 See id. 
146 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962), quoted in Dibadj, 
supra note 144, at 816. 
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Indeed, since the Sherman Act’s passage, the Supreme Court 
has identified a number of goals undergirding U.S. antitrust law, 
not all of which appear consistent with one another.147
• to prevent the concentration of markets through acquisitions, 
and “perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of 
possible cost, an organization of industry in small units 
which can effectively compete with each other”; 
  Over the 
years, the Court has described Congress’s intent behind the 
Sherman Act in various ways, some of which could be viewed as 
in tension with others: 
• to protect firms’ “right of freedom to trade”; 
• to promote consumer welfare, allocative efficiency, and price 
competition; 
• to “protect the public from the failure of the market”; 
• to preserve economic freedom and the freedom for each 
business “to compete—to assert with vigor, imagination, 
devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can 
muster”; 
• to condemn practices that “completely shut[] out competitors, 
not only from trade in which they are already engaged, but 
from the opportunities to build up trade in any community 
where these great and powerful combinations are operating 
under this system and practice”; 
• to “secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public 
against evils commonly incident to destruction of competition 
through monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade”; 
and 
• to “be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at 
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of 
trade.”148
  
 
 
147 See Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 
560−62 (2012). 
148 Id. (quoting various Supreme Court precedents) (citations omitted). See also 
id. at 559−60 (quoting RICHARD HOFSTRADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust 
Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 
199−200 (Vintage 2008)) (reading three sets of goals into the overall objective of 
antitrust law: “(1) economic (competition maximizes “economic efficiency”), 
(2) political (antitrust principles ‘intended to block private accumulations of power 
and protect democratic government’), and (3) social and moral (competitive process 
was ‘disciplinary machinery’ for character development)”). 
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 Tremendous debate continues to rage over how best to 
define, effectuate, and navigate antitrust law’s thorny mission, 
and, predictably, different sides in the debate are championed by 
different schools of economic and social thought.149  Even within 
the federal government, the two agencies entrusted with 
enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws, the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Department of Justice, have not always 
agreed upon the best paths to take.150
Perhaps inevitably, therefore, outside of certain conduct 
circumscribed as per se unlawful,
 
151 the Supreme Court’s modern 
approach to antitrust cases typically reflects a careful balancing 
of interests.152  Indeed, this has been so pronounced that some 
have criticized the Court’s approach as “ad hoc,” to the detriment 
of establishing of a “coherent antitrust jurisprudence.”153
C. The Rule of Reason 
 
Arguably, nothing characterizes the judiciary’s careful, 
balancing approach to its antitrust jurisprudence more than “the 
rule of reason.”  As explained by the Supreme Court in 1911 in 
construing the Sherman Act: 
Thus not specifying, but indubitably contemplating and 
requiring a standard, it follows that it was intended that the 
standard of reason which had been applied at the common law 
and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character 
embraced by the statute was intended to be the measure used 
for the purpose of determining whether, in a given case, a 
particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against 
which the statute provided.154
 
149 See generally Eliot G. Disner, Antitrust Law: The Chicago School Meets the 
Real World, 25 L.A. LAW. 14, 14 (2002); Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: 
Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts? 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 
1191 (1977). 
 
150 See Kelly Everett, Trust Issues: Will President Barack Obama Reconcile the 
Tenuous Relationship Between Antitrust Enforcement Agencies?, 29 J. NAT'L ASS'N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 727, 747–49 (2009). 
151 See infra text accompanying notes 158–160. 
152 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 143, ¶305d at 72; See E. Thomas Sullivan, 
The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court’s Antitrust Policy: The First 
Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 55–56 (1982). 
153 Sullivan, supra note 152, at 56. 
154 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (emphasis 
added). 
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In subsequent cases, the Court would flesh out what exactly 
this “standard of reason” consisted of.155  Its first full articulation 
was set forth by Justice Brandeis seven years later in Chicago 
Board of Trade v. United States156
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be 
determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains 
competition.  Every agreement concerning trade, every 
regulation of trade, restrains.  To bind, to restrain, is of their 
very essence.  The true test of legality is whether the restraint 
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby 
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or 
even destroy competition.  To determine that question the court 
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to 
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, 
actual or probable.  The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, 
the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.  
This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise 
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge 
of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict 
consequences.
 as follows: 
157
Critically, the “Rule of Reason” demands a case-by-case, fact-
based, contextual inquiry regarding the conduct at issue to 
determine whether it violates the Sherman Act’s prohibition on 
“unreasonable” restraints of trade.
 
158
Over time, however, with increased experience in applying 
the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has become comfortable 
with promulgating certain “per se” rules as exceptions to the Rule 
of Reason.
  This careful, arduous 
approach is necessary given the particularly challenging 
balancing act entrusted to antitrust law. 
159
 
155 See Edward D. Cavanagh, The Rule of Reason Re-Examined, 67 BUS. LAW. 
435, 440 (2012). 
  Pursuant to this development, certain 
undertakings are deemed always violative of the Sherman Act, 
regardless of their circumstances, because of their inherently 
156 See generally Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 231 
(1918). 
157 Id. at 238, quoted in Cavanagh, supra note 155, at 441. 
158 See Cavanagh, supra note 155, at 440, 443–44. 
159 See id. at 443–44. 
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“predictable and . . . anticompetitive” nature.160  Conduct 
identified as constituting per se violations of the Sherman Act 
includes price fixing among competitors, group boycotts, and 
tying arrangements.161
D. Market Power 
 
As indicated, an alleged restraint of trade that is not 
circumscribed as a per se violation of the Sherman Act is 
analyzed under the Rule of Reason.162  In conducting this 
analysis, “[o]ne of the most important factors . . . is whether the 
defendant possesses ‘market power’ in the ‘relevant market’ 
where the alleged conduct occurred.”163  Indeed, market power is 
so important that commentators routinely refer to it as “the focal 
point of antitrust law.”164
Initially, antitrust law viewed market power as synonymous 
with “bigness”—a firm’s absolute size as measured by assets, 
sales, or employees.
 
165  Over time, this perspective gave way to 
the concept of “relative size”: a firm’s “share of the industry in 
which it operates.”166
 
 
  Judge Easterbrook provides us with the 
current, most evolved definition of market power, and explains 
its significance too, as follows: 
 
160 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997), quoted in Cavanagh, supra note 
155, at 444 n.82. 
161 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Commentary, Per Se Violations in Antitrust 
Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165, 166 (1988). 
162 See supra notes 158–161. 
163 Benjamin J. Larson, Antitrust For All: A Primer for the Non-Antitrust 
Practitioner, 43 COLO. LAW. 19, 20 (Oct. 2014). 
164 Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect Information: The 
Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and a 
Modest Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REV. 336, 339 (1993); see also AREEDA 
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 143, ¶104b at 85–86 (“Gradually the ‘rule of reason’ used 
to determine whether to enforce contracts in restraint of trade came to focus on the 
defendants’ position in the market.”). But see Mark R. Patterson, The Market Power 
Requirement in Antitrust Rule of Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, 37 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1, 45 (2000) (“The requirement that an antitrust plaintiff show market 
power in rule of reason cases has an uninspiring history and unconvincing 
justifications. Such a requirement has never been adopted by the Supreme Court, 
and is currently imposed by only the Seventh and Forth Circuits.”). 
165 See Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of 
Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 607, 633 (2012). 
166 Id. at 607–08. 
FINAL_COLOMBO 9/13/2018  11:15 AM 
60 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:29   
Market power is the ability to raise price significantly without 
losing so many sales that the increase is unprofitable.  Most 
firms have a little power, because their products are not 
perfectly interchangeable with the goods of others.  But few 
firms have substantial power over price.  Firms that lack power 
cannot injure competition no matter how hard they try.  They 
may injure a few consumers, or a few rivals, or 
themselves . . . by selecting “anticompetitive” tactics.  When the 
firms lack market power, though, they cannot persist in 
deleterious practices.  Rival firms will offer the consumers 
better deals.  Rivals’ better offers will stamp out bad practices 
faster than the judicial process can.  For these and other 
reasons many lower courts have held that proof of market power 
is an indispensable first step in any case under the Rule of 
Reason.  The Supreme Court has established a market power 
hurdle in tying cases, despite the nominally per se character of 
the tying offense, on the same ground offered here: if the 
defendant lacks market power, other firms can offer the 
customer a better deal, and there is no need for judicial 
intervention.167
Easterbrook’s definition of market power, “the ability to raise 
price significantly without losing so many sales that the increase 
is unprofitable,”
 
168 enjoys the familiar benefits of his economic 
expertise.  And it is indeed the standard definition of market 
power used in antitrust.169  But a simpler approach has 
traditionally been employed: that of equating market power with 
market share.170  Generally, the traditional approach works fine, 
for a firm with a very large market share typically enjoys 
tremendous market power.171  However, certain factors can 
indeed complicate matters, such that “[h]igh market share may 
overstate true market power, while low market share may 
understate state it.”172
 
167 Frank H. Easterbook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (1984). 
  Fortunately, for our purposes, the 
exacting precision of an economist such as Judge Easterbook is 
not necessary.  What is essential is recognition of the fact that 
certain firms do in fact possess market power while other firms 
do not.  Those firms that do can be generally identified by the 
predominance of their market share, and/or their ability to 
168 Id. 
169 Orbach & Rebling, supra note 165, at 636. 
170 See Jacobs, supra note 164, at 341–42. 
171 See id. at 343. 
172 Id. at 342. 
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impose their will upon the marketplace.  Or, as the Supreme 
Court put it, a firm with market power has “the power ‘to force a 
purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive 
market.’ ”173  Indeed, the Court’s definition enjoys a facet of 
additional accuracy in that control over price need not be the 
focus of the antitrust inquiry, as “price could be substituted for 
output, product quality, product variety, or other product 
dimensions.”174
Power cannot exist in a vacuum.  Consequently, a critical 
component of the market power analysis is establishing the 
“relevant product and geographic market.”
 
175
Economists utilize the concept of “elasticity” to help define 
the relevant product market for antitrust purposes.
  In other words, 
over what products does a firm in question exercise power, and 
where?  The only seller of light bulbs in a small, remote Alaskan 
town may very well have tremendous market power in that town 
over light bulbs, but will have no power to effect consumers in 
Seattle, Tokyo, or Vienna. 
176  High 
elasticity in the demand of a product indicates the willingness of 
consumers to forgo its purchase in preference to a substitute 
should the product’s price rise significantly.177  Low elasticity, 
conversely, suggests the opposite: the willingness of consumers to 
pay significantly higher prices for a given product rather than 
abandoning it for a substitute.178
With regard to elasticity, it should be acknowledged that for 
many products there exists a core group of consumers with very 
strong preferences for those particular products.  Preferences so 
strong that even a significant increase in a particular product’s 
 
 
173 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) 
(quoting Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984)), quoted in 
Matt Koehler, Comment, The Importance of Correctly Identifying the Consumer for 
an Antitrust Relevant Market Analysis, 67 UMKC L. REV. 521, 525 (1999). 
174 Orbach & Rebling, supra note 165, at 636. It should be noted that as with so 
much of antitrust, even the definition of market power is heavily laden with policy 
considerations, such that a leading antitrust treatise observed: “How much market 
power is excessive enough to warrant intervention under the antitrust laws is 
largely a question of legal policy, not economic fact.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 143, ¶ 502, at 112. 
175 See Koehler, supra note 173. 
176 See id. at 525–26. 
177 See id. at 533–34. 
178 See id. 
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price will not affect this core group’s purchasing patterns.179  
Most courts will not consider this to be evidence of price 
inelasticity.180  Rather, “[m]ost courts implicitly insist that a 
market be ‘substantial’ in scope by ignoring smaller ones.”181
For geographic markets, the definition employed is “the 
geographic area to which consumers can practically turn for 
alternative sources of the product and in which [the firm] face[s] 
competition.”
 
182  Put differently, “where else can the customer go” 
for the product in question—and would a reasonable customer go 
there.183
As with market power itself, the intricacies of market 
definition are not essential for the purposes of this article.  What 
is necessary is simple comprehension of the fact that market 
power must be understood as a contextualized phenomenon: it 
exists in a defined area and over a defined good or service. 
 
As Judge Easterbrook explains further in the excerpt 
provided above, a firm’s market power matters because it is only 
through market power that a firm can inflict competitive harm.184  
This is why a “firm with market power is held to a higher 
standard of business conduct than one without it.”185
 
179 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 143, ¶ 530e, at 241. 
  A firm with 
little or no market power is unlikely to harm anyone.  Should it 
raise its prices to supracompetitive levels, or fail to stock items 
that are in demand, its customers—and potential customers—
would ordinarily have ready recourse to the firm’s competitors.  
Consider, on the other hand, a firm wielding market power, such 
as the archetypical example of a monopolist.  Such a firm can 
dictate, to a very large degree, the prices that will be charged for 
certain goods along with the goods’ availability in a given 
market.  Only at tremendous inconvenience could the firm’s 
customers shop elsewhere; they are essentially beholden to the 
firm’s prices, products, and policies. 
180 See id. 
181 Id. 
182 Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1994), quoted in 
Koehler, supra note 173, at 529. 
183 Koehler, supra note 173, at 532. This is another oversimplification, as 
“[c]ustomer convenience and preference can narrow the geographic scope of a market 
even in the absence of substantial transportation costs.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 143, ¶ 553, at 360. 
184 See Easterbrook, supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
185 See Jacobs, supra note 164. 
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Antitrust’s focus on harm to consumers and competition led 
one leading treatise’s author to note:  “Antitrust is best served if 
it . . . ignore[s] intent and focus[es] on conduct, market structure, 
or other objective considerations.”186
E. Reasonable versus Unreasonable Competition 
 
In its efforts to protect consumers and competition from 
harm, one of the tasks incumbent upon antitrust law is that of 
distinguishing between “reasonable” versus “unreasonable” 
competition—or, within the context of the FTC Act—between 
“fair” versus “unfair” competition.187
The Supreme Court addressed this difficulty in Spectrum 
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan.
  This difficult tight-rope act 
puts on clearest display the usefulness of antitrust law’s recourse 
to market power in its assessment of harm and violations of the 
law. 
188  For the purpose of U.S. antitrust 
law “is not to protect business from the working of the market; it 
is to protect the public from the failure of the market.”189
The law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, 
even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to 
destroy competition itself . . . .  Thus, this Court and other 
courts have been careful to avoid constructions of [the Sherman 
Act] which might chill competition, rather than foster it.  It is 
sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from 
conduct with long-term anticompetitive effects . . . .
  The 
Court elaborated: 
190
This difficulty is compounded by the fact that even the phrase 
“unfair methods of competition,” appearing in section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Act was left undefined by Congress.
 
191
 
186 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 143, ¶ 113, at 144. 
 
187 The difference between assessing whether conduct is “reasonable” versus 
“unreasonable” on the one hand and assessing whether conduct is “fair” versus 
“unfair” on the other, although interesting, need not detain us here. For our 
purposes, given that our focus is on general antitrust principles—and not careful, 
specific applications of antitrust law in the context of antitrust problems—this 
difference is not material. 
188 See generally Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 447 (1993). 
189 Id. at 458. 
190 Id. at 458–59; see also Int’l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 
F.2d 1255, 1267 (8th Cir. 1980). 
191 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920). 
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Not surprisingly, a fierce debate persists over what, exactly, 
terms such as “fair” and “unfair,” “reasonable” and 
“unreasonable” refer to.192  Some read these terms in their 
ordinary sense, as conveying a sense of moral rectitude or 
indecency.193  Others read these terms through economic lenses, 
as shorthand for conduct injurious to “consumers’ welfare and 
allocative efficiency.”194
From this language’s inception, however, it was understood 
that “whether competition is fair or unfair depends in a peculiar 
degree upon the circumstances of the particular case.”
 
195  This, in 
turn, apparently contributed to the language’s ambiguity and the 
lack of a precise articulation of offensive—that is, “unfair” or 
“unreasonable”—practices, for “it would be impossible through 
legislation to define the many ways in which a large company 
might engage in unfair competition without at the same time 
strait-jacketing other, smaller businesses that might use the very 
same methods to compete against those larger firms.”196
A critical factor in distinguishing conduct that is “fair” or 
“reasonable” versus that which is deemed “unfair” or 
“unreasonable”—and, consequently, violative of federal antitrust 
law—is the market power of the actor.
 
197  As discussed 
previously, a firm without market power simply cannot or is 
highly unlikely to inflict harm upon consumers or competition as 
could a firm with market power.198  Consequently, for all 
practical purposes, the possession of market power has been 
baked into the very definition of what constitutes unfair or 
unreasonable competition.  As a result, “it has been accepted in 
antitrust law that ‘Davids can engage in many kinds of conduct 
in the marketplace that are forbidden to Goliaths.’ ”199
 
192 See Thomas J. Horton, Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary 
Perspective, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 823, 827–51 (2013); Lambert, supra note 131, at 
875. 
 
193 See Horton, supra note 192, at 835–51. 
194 Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 567 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting). 
195 See Kolasky, supra note 141, 108 (quoting Editorial, The Judiciary 
Committee’s Blunder, 59 HARPER’S WKLY, 121, Aug. 8, 1914). 
196 Id. 
197 See Int’l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1267 (8th 
Cir. 1980); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 556 (7th Cir. 1980). 
198 See supra Part II.D. 
199 Int’l Travel Arrangers, Inc., 623 F.2d at 1267 (quoting Purex Corp. v. Proctor 
& Gamble Co., 596 F.2d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
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An example of how this has played out is furnished by the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in FTC v. Texaco.200  At issue in 
FTC v. Texaco was, among other things, whether respondent 
Texaco’s practice of inducing its service station dealers “to 
purchase Goodrich tires, batteries, and accessories . . . in return 
for a commission paid by Goodrich to Texaco[]” constituted 
“ . . . an unfair method of competition.”201  In finding a violation of 
Section 5 of the FTC Act, the Court made a point to observe that 
“Texaco holds dominant economic power over its dealers . . . ,” a 
finding of fact that no party to the case disputed.202  As the Court 
explained, “[i]t is against the background of this dominant 
economic power . . . that the sales-commission arrangement must 
be viewed.”203
In CBS v. FTC, the Seventh Circuit was even clearer than 
the Supreme Court in underscoring the importance of market 
power in assessing the unfairness of conduct in question.
  Although not stated explicitly, it is rather clear 
from the opinion that had Texaco not enjoyed such economic 
dominance over its service station dealers there probably would 
not have been a violation of Section 5 in that case. 
204  At 
issue in CBS v. FTC was the licensing practice of CBS’s 
subsidiary, Columbia Record Club (“Columbia”).205  Columbia 
sold phonographic records by mail via catalog, and would include 
the offerings of small record company manufacturers only if those 
companies agreed not to sell any of their records to another 
record club.206  The FTC asserted that this practice constituted 
an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 of the 
FTC Act.207
In assessing the FTC’s case against CBS, the Seventh 
Circuit explained the importance of determining, as a threshold 
matter, Columbia’s market power.
 
208
 
200 See generally 393 U.S. 223, 223 (1968). 
  “To determine whether the 
exclusive licensing provision is an unfair method of competition 
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,” the Court 
wrote, “the relevant market within which to measure the effect 
201 Id. at 224. 
202 Id. at 226. 
203 Id. at 227. 
204 See generally 414 F.2d 974, 974 (1969). 
205 See id. at 976. 
206 See id. 
207 See id at 975. 
208 See id. at 978. 
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on competition must be defined.”209  Having defined the relevant 
market as “the record club market,” the Court then proceeded to 
examine the market’s structure.210  This is essential because 
dominance over a market that is fluid, or that lacks significant 
barriers to entry, gives merely the illusion of market power.211  
Given changes in the record industry between the time that the 
FTC filed its complaint against CBS in 1962 and the date of the 
FTC’s opinion in 1967, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
additional hearings were necessary and as such remanded the 
case.212  Thus, whether or not Columbia’s conduct was deemed 
“unfair” in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act turned, in large 
part, upon Columbia’s market power.  Put differently, the 
conduct itself could not be considered unfair absent an inquiry 
into Columbia’s market power.213
III. APPLICATION OF MARKET POWER CONSIDERATIONS TO 
CORPORATE ASSERTIONS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
 
The proper scope of religious liberty exemptions remains a 
hotly debated, divisive issue.  In 2015, the drama played out in 
Indiana, when a proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 
that state touched off a firestorm of controversy.214  The drama 
repeated itself in 2016, in Georgia and Mississippi, when similar 
bills passed the legislatures of those states.215
 
209 Id. 
  In each situation, 
210 See id. at 981. 
211 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 143, ¶ 500, at 89–90.  
212 See CBS, 414 F.2d at 981–82. 
213 It should be noted that reference to market power is not a unique 
characteristic of U.S. federal antitrust law, but can be seen in the antitrust law of 
other nations as well. E.g., GABRIEL MOENS ET AL., COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 199-200, § 6.105-6.110 (2010) (discussing “abuse of a dominant 
position” under European Union law). It must also be remembered, however, that 
despite its critical relevance to antitrust analysis, the possession of market power 
per se, without more, does not constitute a violation of U.S. antitrust law. See Pac. 
Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Comm., Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447–48 (2009). 
214 See Tony Cook and Brian Eason, Gov. Mike Pence signs RFRA fix, INDYSTAR 
(April 2, 2015, 8:08 PM EDT), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/ 
01/indiana-rfra-deal-sets-limited-protections-for-lgbt/70766920/. 
215 See Alan Blinder and Richard Perez-Pena, Georgia Governor Rejects Bill 
Shielding Critics of Gay Marriage, NY TIMES (March 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2016/03/29/us/georgia-governor-rejects-bill-shielding-critics-of-gay-
marriage.html?_r=0; Eliott C. McLaughlin, Mississippi passes religious freedom bill 
that LGBT groups call discriminatory, CNN (April 6, 2016, 6:54 AM), http://www.cn 
n.com/2016/04/05/us/mississippi-governor-signs-religious-freedom-bill/index.html. 
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the battle lines drawn were similar: on one side were those 
seeking to protect those individuals whose consciences precluded 
them from complying with certain laws, and on the other, those 
seeking to vigorously enforce those same laws—laws ostensibly 
designed to grant and protect the rights of certain individuals.216  
These issues are felt most acutely when the religious exemptions 
in question are asserted by a corporate claimant.  For in 
corporate and other business claimant cases, third-party harms 
are both more frequently presented and typically more serious in 
nature.  An individual seeking a religious liberty exemption from 
a state’s controlled substance abuse laws simply does not 
ordinarily impinge upon the rights and privileges of his or her 
fellow Americans the same way a business entity seeking a 
religious liberty exemption from a state’s antidiscrimination laws 
does.217
Concrete examples of such claims implicating third-party 
interests abound.  Previously discussed were cases stemming 
from the “contraceptive mandate” regulations issued pursuant to 
the ACA.
 
218  These regulations forced companies to provide 
health insurance coverage that subsidized products and 
practices—more specifically, artificial birth control, including 
abortifacient hormonal contraception—in contravention of the 
religiously inspired principles upon which certain companies 
were founded and pursuant to which they operated.219  The 
federal government, in promulgating these regulations, 
ostensibly did so out of its understanding of what’s best for 
women’s health.220
 
216 See, e.g., Steve Sanders, RFRAs and Reasonableness, 91 IND. L.J. 243, 248–
49 (2016). 
 
217 See Nejaime and Siegel, supra note 86. This is because modern corporate free 
exercise claims have been typically asserted against legislation and regulations 
designed to protect third parties, and predicated upon the argument that obedience 
to such laws would constitute illicit complicity with moral wrongdoing. See supra  
text accompanying note 86. For a discussion of a traditional approach to the question 
of moral complicity with wrongdoing (referred to as “cooperation with evil”), see 
Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation With Securities Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 89–97 
(2009). 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 83–88. 
219 See id. 
220 Madison Park, Birth Control Should be Fully Covered Under Health Plans, 
Report Says, CNN (July 19, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/07/19/birth. 
control.iom/ (cited in Genna Fasullo, Circumventing the Affordable Care Act 
Contraceptive Mandate, 16 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 55, 55 n.1 (2013)). 
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Prior to the ACA, similar issues arose with regard to health 
care professionals who opposed, for reasons of religious 
conscience, fulfilling certain prescriptions or participating in 
certain procedures.221  A typical case would be that of a 
pharmacist objecting to the dispensing of emergency 
contraceptives, which are viewed by many as abortifacient.222  
These cases were usually brought by individual pharmacists, but 
there is no reason why they could not be brought by a pharmacy 
itself, as some have been.223
Another, more recent set of examples, stems from the advent 
of same-sex marriage in the United States, and its interplay with 
antidiscrimination laws, especially in the aftermath of Obergefell 
v. Hodges.
 
224  In Obergefell, the Supreme Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gives rise to 
“[t]he right of same-sex couples to marry.”225
For in many jurisdictions prior to Obergefell, although 
marriage was not extended to same-sex couples, homosexual 
individuals otherwise enjoyed the same familiar 
antidiscrimination benefits that protected Americans against 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or creed.
  In one fell swoop, 
Obergefell not only swept away laws that had recognized 
marriage as solely between a man and woman, but also 
effectively made opposition to same-sex marriage subject to state 
antidiscrimination laws.  The consequences of this have been 
profound. 
226
 
221 See Kent Greenawalt, Objections in Conscience to Medical Procedures: Does 
Religion Make a Difference?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 818–19 (2006); Francis J. 
Manion, Protecting Conscience Through Litigation: Lessons Learned in the Land of 
Blagojevich, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 369, 395–96 (2012). 
  This 
222 See Manion, supra note 221. As for whether emergency contraception is 
indeed abortifacient, compare Mathew Lu, Abortiofacients, Emergency 
Contraception, and Terminating Pregnancy, THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE: PUBLIC 
DISCOURSE (April 4, 2014), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/04/12973/, with 
OFFICE OF POPULATION RESEARCH, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, Answers to Frequently 
Asked Questions About . . . How Emergency Contraception Works, THE EMERGENCY 
CONTRACEPTION WEBSITE (last visited Mar. 25, 2018), 
http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ecabt.html. 
223 E.g., Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). 
224 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015). 
225 Id. at 2602. 
226 Such states would have included Hawaii (banning discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation in employment and public accommodations, see HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 378-2 and HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-2, but also not recognizing same-sex 
marriage until 2013, see H.B. 2312, 17th Leg. (Haw. 1994) (precluding same-sex 
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limited the conflict between religious individuals and 
antidiscrimination laws.227  Indeed, state-based RFRA claims 
prior to Obergefell, as a whole, were “exceedingly rare,”228 and 
conflict with antidiscrimination laws was only “occasional.”229
With regard to RFRA-based challenges to antidiscrimination 
laws, it should not come as much as a surprise that such 
challenges were relatively rare before Obergefell.  For although 
there are very clear, longstanding religious traditions regarding 
the nature and definition of marriage, none of these traditions—
of which I am aware—counsel in favor of discriminating carte 
blanche against individuals qua individuals.
 
230
 
marriage), HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (recognizing same-sex marriage)); Nevada 
(banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment, see 
Assemb. B. 311, 1999 Leg. (Nev. 1999), but also not recognizing same-sex marriage 
until 2014, see NEV. CONST. Art. I, § 21 (precluding same-sex marriage), Latta v. 
Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464–65 (9th Cir. 2014) (requiring recognition of same-sex 
marriage)); Oregon (banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
housing, employment, and public accommodations; see OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030, 
but also not recognizing same-sex marriage until 2014; see OR. CONST. Art. XV, § 5a 
(precluding same-sex marriage), Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132–33 
(D. Or. 2014) (requiring recognition of same-sex marriage)); and Wisconsin (banning 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, see WIS. STAT. § 111.36 (1993), but 
also not recognizing same-sex marriage until 2014, see WIS. CONST. Art. 13, § 13 
(precluding same-sex marriage), Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(requiring recognition of same-sex marriage)). 
  Put differently, 
227 The conflict nevertheless still existed. See Melissa Fishman Cordish, 
Comment, A Proposal for the Reconciliation of Free Exercise Rights and Anti-
Discrimination Law, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2113, 2116–17 (1996). 
228 Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State 
RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 467 (2010). 
229 Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in America and the End of the Century, 16 
J.L. & RELIG. 187, 209 (2001). 
230 The Catechism of the Catholic Church provides an excellent example of this, 
by simultaneously denouncing both homosexual activity and discrimination against 
homosexual individuals: 
2357 Homosexuality refers to relations between men or between women 
who experience an exclusive or predominant sexual attraction toward 
persons of the same sex. It has taken a great variety of forms through the 
centuries and in different cultures. Its psychological genesis remains 
largely unexplained. Basing itself on Sacred Scripture, which presents 
homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity, tradition has always declared 
that “homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered.” They are contrary to 
the natural law. They close the sexual act to the gift of life. They do not 
proceed from a genuine affective and sexual complementarity. Under no 
circumstances can they be approved. 
2358 The number of men and women who have deep-seated homosexual 
tendencies is not negligible. This inclination, which is objectively 
disordered, constitutes for most of them a trial. They must be accepted with 
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although many religions have a lot to say about marriage and 
sexual ethics, none, to my knowledge, address less weighty 
questions such as to whom may I sell a car, or whom may I 
permit to use my laundromat?  Thus, a devoutly religious 
individual could typically remain fully faithful to his or her 
understanding of marriage without ever running afoul of laws 
protecting individuals from discrimination on account of their 
sexual orientation.231
Post-Obergefell, however, religious opposition to same-sex 
marriage and discrimination against homosexual individuals has 
been legally conflated.  This gives rise to a serious predicament 
for many of those who might be called upon to provide goods and 
services for a same-sex wedding ceremony or celebration.  
Consequently, photographers, florists, and bakers have made 
headlines for refusing to violate their religious consciences in 
order to comply with local antidiscrimination laws.
 
232
Perhaps no case illustrates this transformed landscape 
better than the plight of Barronelle Stutzman, owner of Arlene’s 
Flowers.
 
233
 
respect, compassion, and sensitivity. Every sign of unjust discrimination in 
their regard should be avoided. These persons are called to fulfill God’s will 
in their lives and, if they are Christians, to unite to the sacrifice of the 
Lord’s Cross the difficulties they may encounter from their condition. 
  For ten years, she served, without incident, Rob 
Ingersoll, one of her customers.  According to Ms. Stutzman, they 
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 2357, 2538 (1994). 
231 One flashpoint, even pre-Obergefell, concerned landlords, some of whom 
refused to lease apartments to unmarried couples. See Cordish, supra note 227, at 
2113–14. 
232 See Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage 
Debates, 89 IND. L.J. 703, 711 (2014). It should be noted that even before Obergefell, 
however, some disputes between wedding vendors and same-sex couples still 
occurred, for even in states where same-sex marriage was not legal, same-sex 
couples did celebrate their unions and in doing so called upon service providers who 
had religious objections to these celebrations. See Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, 
Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 619, 621 (2015). 
233 Barronelle Stutzman, Why a Friend Is Suing Me: The Arlene's Flowers Story, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/why-a-good-
friend-is-suing-me-the-arlenes-flowers-story [http://perma.cc/BU5V-ZS42] (cited in 
Sherif Girgis, Nervous Victors, Illiberal Measures: A Response to Douglas Nejaime 
and Reva Siegal, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 399, 412 n.65 (2016); Washington v. Arlene’s 
Flowers, 389 P.3d 543, 568 (Wash. 2017) (en banc) (holding that Stutzman’s refusal 
to provide flowers for same-sex wedding constituted unlawful, unexcused 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of Washington law). 
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“hit it off” due to their shared “artist’s eye.”234  Although Mr. 
Ingersoll “was in a relationship with a man,” and Ms. Stutzman 
“was a Christian,” that “never clouded the friendship for either 
[of them] or threatened [their] shared creativity.”235
But then Mr. Ingersoll asked Ms. Stutzman to “design 
something special to celebrate his upcoming wedding” to his male 
partner.
 
236
If all he’d asked for were prearranged flowers, I’d gladly have 
provided them.  If the celebration were for his partner’s 
birthday, I’d have been delighted to pour my best into the 
challenge.  But as a Christian, weddings have a particular 
significance. 
  This she could not, in good conscience, do, for reasons 
that she explains well in her own words: 
Marriage does celebrate two people’s love for one another, but 
its sacred meaning goes far beyond that.  Surely without 
intending to do so, Rob was asking me to choose between my 
affection for him and my commitment to Christ.  As deeply fond 
as I am of Rob, my relationship with Jesus is everything to me.  
Without Christ, I can do nothing.237
Ms. Stutzman proceeded to suggest “three other nearby 
florists” who she “knew would do an excellent job for this 
celebration.”
 
238  She was promptly sued for discrimination.  As 
Ms. Stutzman explained, “[t]his case is not about refusing service 
on the basis of sexual orientation or dislike for another person 
who is preciously created in God’s image.  I sold flowers to Rob 
for years.  I helped him find someone else to design his wedding 
arrangements.  I count him as a friend.”239  Rather, it was about 
obedience to one’s religiously informed conscience.240
Opponents to religious liberty exemptions oftentimes 
characterize the proponents of such exemptions as little more 
than bigots.
 
241  Ms. Stutzman’s case belies that.242
 
234 Stutzman, supra note 233. 
  Indeed, 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 See id. 
241 E.g., Editorial, In Indiana, Using Religion as a Cover for Bigotry, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/opinion/in-indiana-using-
religion-as-a-cover-for-bigotry.html (cited in Koppelman, supra note 232, at 653 
n.163); Shannon Gilreath and Ashley Ward, Same-Sex Marriage, Religious 
Accomodation, and the Race Analogy, 41 VT. L. REV. 237, 246 (2016) (“[T]he 
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perhaps the most well-known conscientious objection in all of 
history to recognizing a particular marriage was that of St. 
Thomas More, who famously died “the King’s good servant but 
God’s first.”243  That is, he died maintaining his opposition to the 
King’s second marriage without harboring any recorded animus 
whatsoever against King Henry VIII himself.244
It is important to call to mind examples such as Ms. 
Stutzman’s to underscore the point that principled opposition to 
same-sex marriage, or abortion, or contraception—to take other 
frequent examples—can exist without any animus toward those 
individuals for whom antidiscrimination or access laws are 
designed to protect.
 
245
 
argument that anti-gay discrimination is somehow qualitatively different from anti-
black discrimination is bunk. It is a convenient smoke screen enabling bigots to 
mask their true animus.”). 
  This is necessary to justify the 
compromise set forth below.  Few, myself included, wish to 
broker a compromise between laws safeguarding civil rights and 
health care access on the one hand and the purveyors of bigotry 
242 Also belying such an ignorant mischaracterization of all who would dare seek 
an exemption from the equal access / antidiscrimination laws as applied to 
contraception and same sex marriage would be St. John Paul II’s “Theology of the 
Body.” See JOHN PAUL II, MAN AND WOMAN HE CREATED THEM: A THEOLOGY OF THE 
BODY (Michael Waldenstein, ed. & trans. 2006). This Article posits that no fair 
minded person could, in good faith, ascribe bigotry to this work, which painstakingly 
proffers an understanding of sex and marriage that precludes contraception and 
other “illicit practices against generation.” See id. at 362–364, 628–639. John Paul 
II’s writings do not address the issue of religious liberty exemptions. Nor do his 
writings directly address the philosophical issue of whether one’s sale of artificial 
birth control, abortifacients, or goods and services for use in a same-sex wedding 
ceremony constitute what’s referred to as illicit “cooperation” in the conduct of their 
purchasers. See, e.g., 1 KARL H. PESCHKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 320 (1986). Indeed, 
within John Paul II’s Catholic tradition, it’s not entirely clear that an exemption 
would be needed in all such situations. See Robert T. Miller, The Shopkeeper’s 
Dilemma and Cooperation with Evil, THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE: PUBLIC 
DISCOURSE (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/03/14423. But 
John Paul II’s writings do make clear that the beliefs motivating religious liberty 
exemption claims from the laws referenced above can very well be predicated upon 
reason and serious philosophical principles—not simply, inevitably, or necessarily 
bigotry and animus. 
243 R. MARIUS, THOMAS MORE, A BIOGRAPHY 513–14 (1985), quoted in Stephen 
M. Deitsch, Thomas More: A Fine Lawyer and a Fine Man, 17 DCBA Brief 12 (2004). 
244 See PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE 403 (1998) (On the 
morning of his execution, Thomas More remarked that “I have always been much 
bounden to the king’s highness for the benefits and honours that he hath still from 
time to time most bountifully heaped upon me . . . . I will not fail earnestly to pray 
for his grace, both here and also in another world”). 
245 See MARIUS, supra note 243. 
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on the other, based upon some pretextual recourse to religious 
liberty.  But certainly many who assert religiously based 
objections to these laws do so in good faith, devoid of ill-will or 
bad intent, giving lie to the widespread (mis)characterization of 
such objectors. 
Consequently, the issue of religious exemptions from laws 
protecting third parties presents us with a very real clash of 
important values.  Or, perhaps more accurately, the imperfect 
realization of one value: that of securing full citizenship to all 
members of our society, especially to those who are members of 
minority groups or otherwise vulnerable.  Like a Rorschach test, 
the previous sentence perhaps calls to mind different classes of 
people depending upon the reader.246  To some, homosexuals, 
same-sex couples, and women are those vulnerable members of 
our society who require the law’s protections.  But to other 
readers, those individuals who continue to adhere to certain 
traditional religious views of marriage and sexual norms, against 
the clear trajectory of modern opinion, constitute a vulnerable 
minority.247
Moreover, “people who decide that they do not want to trade 
with or hire certain people” on such grounds “are making a 
decision that has more than just external costs.”
 
248  For they 
themselves “bear a large part of the costs . . . for their decisions 
will surely limit their own opportunities for advancement and 
success, even as it leaves others free to pursue alternate 
opportunities.”249  Despite its persistence, therefore, we ought not 
forget that market-place discrimination ordinarily imposes real 
costs upon the discriminator as well as upon the victim of 
discrimination.250  Consequently, there are “natural curbs” 
against such economically inefficient behavior.251
 
246 See Erik Luna, The .22 Caliber Rorschach Test, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 53, 54 
(2002) (discussing the Rorschach ink-blot test). 
 
247 See Sanders, supra note 217, at 246–47 (2016). This has led Richard Epstein 
to remark “In these settings, the utter inability to understand who is coercing whom 
reveals the great danger of a kind of law that forces the unwilling to yield to its 
commands when all they want is to be free to practice their own faith.” See Epstein, 
Freedom of Association, supra note 13. 
248 See EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 13, at 41–42 (citing Gary S. 
Becker, The Economics of Discrimination, ch. 3 (2nd ed., 1971). 
249 Id.at 42. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. There is, perhaps, no more paradigmatic example of widespread 
discrimination against a particular, vulnerable group than that of the American 
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But not all contexts are identical.  In some towns or regions, 
the economic and material harms of discrimination may fall more 
heavily upon one party versus another.  In other words, which 
group should more properly be characterized as “minority” or 
more “vulnerable” perhaps turns best upon the venue or situation 
in question.  And that serves as a fitting segue to our advertence 
to antitrust law. 
A. In Theory 
Tasked with the unenviable responsibility of protecting 
competition generally by curtailing certain forms of competition 
individually, antitrust law lights the way forward.  With over a 
century of case law under its belt, antitrust law has learned to 
address the tension inherent in its mandate by recognizing the 
critical importance of context.252
For, as we have seen, “context” here means, primarily, 
market power.
  For in the light of context, 
conduct that can be deemed reasonable or fair for one firm can be 
deemed unreasonable or unfair when undertaken by another.  
Further, even conduct engaged in by the very same firm could be 
deemed reasonable versus unreasonable depending upon the 
time, place, and circumstances of its engagement. 
253
 
South during the Jim Crow era. This causes many to question the efficacy of the 
market’s “natural curbs” against discrimination. Richard Epstein offers an 
interesting counter-interpretation of this example: 
  When a firm lacks market power its ability to 
compete unfairly, and to harm consumers, is significantly 
impeded.  In the absence of market power, consumers, venders, 
suppliers, and actors throughout the marketplace ordinarily have 
alternatives to which they can turn in the face of a firm’s 
The history of failure in the South is not a history of the failure of 
individual character or individual will. It is not a history of the failure of 
markets . . . . To the contrary, the lessons from our history of civil rights all 
stem from two sources: first, the abnegation of the principles of limited 
government, that is, government restricted to those areas where it is 
required, such as taxation and law enforcement; and second, the massive 
state legislative regulation of private markets that was left unchecked by 
passive judicial action. 
Id. at 94. Epstein proceeds to point out that the notorious Supreme Court 
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which centered upon a 
Louisiana statute (the “Separate Car Act”) requiring racial segregation on 
railways, suggests that the state’s private railways “were—or, more likely, 
had become—unwilling to practice racial discrimination.” Id. at 102. 
252 See supra Part II.D. 
253 See id. 
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misconduct.  Conversely, a firm in possession of market power 
may be able to impose its will upon consumers and other 
marketplace participants to their detriment. 
Although antitrust law is not analogous to 
antidiscrimination law, or to the law of religious liberty, its focus 
on market power is nevertheless a helpful tool for addressing the 
dilemma of corporate free exercise exemptions.  For, as with 
antitrust, a firm’s market power could be used as a proxy to 
gauge how harmful to third-party interests that firm’s 
misconduct could be in the context of religious liberty 
exemptions.  In the realm of religious liberty exemptions, the 
“misconduct” referred to is that behavior that violates a law of 
general applicability designed to protect or further some third-
party interest.  A firm with marginal market share is simply not 
in a position to inflict the same degree of harm that a firm with 
dominant market share is. 
Harkening back to some of the real-life examples identified 
above, consider the question of access to birth control, or the 
procurement of a wedding cake: a business lacking any 
appreciable market power will simply not be able to frustrate 
public policy objectives the way a business with sizeable market 
power could.  A family-owned drugstore in Manhattan, or a 
bakery in Jersey City, regardless of how restrictive its policies 
might be, will simply not be able to prevent someone from 
obtaining contraceptives or catering services.  As such, granting 
religious liberty exemptions to such drugstores or bakeries 
should not be viewed as overly problematic.  Moreover, in 
balancing the harms that would accrue to the parties involved, 
granting the exemption in such circumstances seems to be the 
fairest approach. 
We have previously addressed the important values that a 
robust approach to religious liberty protects.254  Bluntly put, a 
modern, civilized society generally avoids forcing its members to 
choose between God and Caesar.  History and philosophy 
strongly attest to such a careful approach—both of which were 
well understood by the men and women who founded the United 
States.255
 
254 See supra Part I.A. 
  This suggests that, for reasons both normative and  
 
255 See id. 
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practical, we find a way to accommodate the religious convictions 
and consciences of our fellow Americans to the widest extent 
reasonably possible. 
Of course, laws designed to ensure access to goods and 
services, be they antidiscrimination laws or certain health care 
regulations, also serve valuable and important purposes.  
Primarily, they serve to ensure said access or to “ameliorat[e] 
economic inequality.”256  But they also serve to recognize, foster, 
and protect, at the behest of the state, the equal dignity of the 
individuals on whose behalf they have been promulgated.257
The justification lies in recognizing, as has been suggested 
previously, the intractable, zero-sum game at play when it comes 
to the question of dignity.  There is no way around this facet of 
the dilemma: either the dignity of the religious claimant will be 
infringed upon, or that of the protected third party.  In such 
situations, the state should not “take sides” and value the dignity 
of one group of citizens over another.
  In 
light of these dual objectives, how could a religious 
accommodation ever be justified?  For even if the firm seeking an 
objection lacks market power, its very ability to decline its goods 
or services to a protected third party implicates this secondary 
purpose of the law in question, that regarding equal dignity. 
258  The state ought not to, 
through its weight and coercive power, prioritize these groups as 
first class versus second class, subjugating the dignity interests 
of one to the dignity interests of the other.259
 
256 Koppelman, supra note 232, at 627. 
  Instead, in such 
257 See Nejaime and Siegel, supra note 86, at 2574–78; Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. 
Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 349, 349–50 
(2015). 
258 Cf. See EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 13, at 498 (there is no 
easy way “to trade off symbol against symbol, or different symbolic views of the same 
legal rules against one another. Given the limits of our knowledge . . . the best way 
to take into account the full range of symbols, good and bad, noble and vain, is for 
the legal system to ignore them all.”). 
259 See also id. at 497 (“The problem of social governance . . . requires that we 
make peace not with our friends but with our enemies, and this can be done only if 
we show some respect for their preferences even when we detest them.”). Although 
the government ought not to prioritize one class of claimants against the other here, 
a strong argument could be made that the free exercise/religious liberty claimants 
are entitled to prioritization. For a truly neutral state of affairs would be one in 
which the government prescinds from interfering with private ordering. It is only 
because of government’s interference, in the form of civil rights legislation for 
example, that the conflict between rights even arises. Absent the government’s 
involvement, all parties, both buyers and sellers, employers and employees, would be 
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situations, the law should proceed by examining other, more 
practical and objective factors at play.  A review of these factors 
helps elucidate the benefits of pursuing an approach to corporate 
free exercise exemptions predicated upon market power.260
Let’s consider the repercussions of a regime that grants, 
versus one that denies, a religious liberty exemption on the basis 
of market power.  To facilitate matters, let’s take a concrete 
example: the case of a family-owned pharmacy that, on account of 
the family’s religious beliefs, does not sell artificial birth control.  
The pharmacy seeks an exemption from a state law mandating 
that all pharmacies within its jurisdiction stock and supply 
certain forms of artificial birth control. 
 
With regard to the dignity question, recognition of a religious 
exemption for objecting pharmacies effectuates a policy of state 
neutrality.  By mandating, generally, the widespread availability 
of artificial contraception, the state cannot be accused of failing 
to respect the equality or dignity of women and their choices.261  
And by coupling this legislation with an exemption for religiously 
based conscientious objection, the law would be countenancing a 
narrow exception that could not fairly be said to swallow the rule.  
But the exemption, though narrow, would broadcast the same 
affirming message to religious individuals that the general 
legislation broadcast to the state’s birth-control using population: 
that their concerns are valid and that they have a right to live 
out their lives in conformity with their values.  Expressed in 
mathematical language, these “dignity” concerns appear to cancel 
each other out.262
 
free to exercise their consciences as best seen fit. As such, religious liberty 
exemptions merely return the situation to its state of affairs ex ante, prior to the 
time in which the government decided to interfere with private ordering via its legal 
circumscription of prejudice, protection, and / or preference. 
  Since effectuation of these principles is a  
 
 
 
260 Cf. Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Claims 
Have in Common, 5 NW J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 206, 212–26 (2010). 
261 At least to those who believe that the dignity and equality of women is a 
function of the availability of artificial birth control. See Seigel and Seigel, supra 
note 257, at 349–50. 
262 But see Nejaime and Siegel, supra note 86, at 2580 (asserting that an 
accommodation that would inflict either a “material or dignitary harm” to a 
protected third-party would implicate a compelling government interest) (emphasis 
added). 
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matter of abstraction, this conclusion would be the same 
regardless of whether the pharmacy possessed or lacked market 
power.263
Although market power could arguably impact our 
assessment of dignitary harm—by helping us to assess how 
widespread and common denials of service might be—its 
presence or absence plays a particularly important role with 
respect to our analysis of the material harm that an exemption 
may inflict or prevent.  Put differently, market power helps us 
assess the practical ability of parties to conduct themselves in 
accordance with their principles and values in light of a potential 
religious liberty exemption from a law of general applicability.  If 
a pharmacy lacks market power—meaning that it has multiple 
nearby competitors—granting an exemption to a law requiring 
pharmacies to stock and dispense artificial birth control pills and 
devices would allow the pharmacy to remain true to its principles 
without denying the protected third-parties the practical value of 
the law—namely, ready access to artificial contraception.
 
264
 
263 That said, some commentators call into question the weight of dignitary 
harms that are rare or unusual in nature. As Andy Koppelman has written, “[t]he 
sense of insult and dehumanization” that accompanies a refusal of service “depends 
in part on systemic effects that go beyond the particular transaction. An insult that 
is unusual loses much of its sting.” See Koppelman, supra note 232, at 645. This 
suggests that, contrary to my inclination, market power is not irrelevant to the 
“dignity harm” analysis. Moreover, other scholars have pointed out that, in the free 
speech context at least, “the Supreme Court has consistently held that a 
government’s desire to protect people from emotional harm . . . does not constitute a 
compelling government interest.” See Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, 
Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A Defense of Religious 
Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV 1595, 1624 (2018). Indeed, as these scholars have 
pointed out: “it is difficult to imagine more excruciating humiliation, degradation, or 
emotional harm than that endured by the father who saw Westboro Baptist Church 
picketers with signs stating ‘God Hates Fags,’ ‘You’re Going to Hell,’ and ‘God Hates 
You’ at the funeral of his son,” yet that has been upheld as protected First 
Amendment activity. Id. This serves to underscore the propriety of focusing on the 
access to goods and services objective of antidiscrimination law when challenged on 
First Amendment Free Exercise grounds as applied to certain religious minorities. 
  As 
264 It must be recognized that the possibility exists for material harm to be 
inflicted by religious liberty exemptions or accommodations even in a market in 
which no single firm wields market power. For a situation could arise where all or 
most firms in a competitive market refuse to provide a particular good or service in 
question to the detriment of a protected third-party interest. Were this situation the 
result of intentional coordination among the firms, antitrust law again would 
furnish us with an answer. Under antitrust law, it is unlawful for a group of firms 
with market power to do that which a single firm with market power could not do. 
See supra text accompanying note 128 (“Every contract, combination in the form of 
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Richard Epstein has noted, “the critical question for [a person’s] 
welfare is not which opportunities are lost but which are 
retained.”265
Conversely, denying the exemption in such circumstances 
provides little practical benefit to the law’s beneficiaries because, 
as stated, multiple other pharmacies exist that would readily 
supply the products in question, but would have the devastating 
effect of precluding the pharmacy from operating in accordance 
with the religious principles upon which it was founded.  In 
practical terms, this would probably put the pharmacy out of 
business.  As one commentator explained, using a different 
example: 
 
Denials of service do affect gay couples by causing them 
disturbance, hurt, and offense.  While acknowledging that 
harm, one must also acknowledge, I think, that the harm to the 
objector from legal sanctions is greater and more concrete.  In 
most cases, the offended couple can go to the next entry in the 
phone book or the Google result.  The individual or organization 
held liable for discrimination, by contrast, must either violate 
the tenets of her (its) faith or else exit the social service, 
profession, or livelihood in which she (it) has invested time, 
effort, and money.  One simply has not given the religious 
dissenter’s interest significant weight if one finds that offense or 
disturbance from messages of disapproval are sufficient to 
override it. . . . “[A]ctual people should not be harmed for the 
sake of symbolic gestures.”266
 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to 
be illegal.”). Analogously, a religious liberty exemption should be denied to any firm 
in a group of firms that (1) collectively possess market power and (2) conspire to 
deny a particular product or service to a protected third-party population. 
 
But what if this apparent conspiracy is instead the result of separate, individual, 
non-coordinated decisions? What if the firms and their managers simply adhere to a 
similar set of values and beliefs, and as such conduct themselves similarly without 
any collaboration between or among them? 
No obvious answers present themselves. But based upon the principle, articulated 
previously, that a religious exemption should not cause material, objective harm to a 
third-party interest, see supra text accompanying note 268, it would stand to reason 
that the exemption should not be recognized in such cases for at least one of these 
companies. 
265 See EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 13, at 30. 
266  Berg, supra note 260, at 229 (pointing out that many of the proponents and 
opponents of religious liberty exemptions to laws protecting third parties predicate 
their arguments upon similar principles: (1) the importance of conduct fundamental 
to identity, (2) the right to live out one’s life publicly in civil society, and (3) the 
claimed virtuousness, or objective value, of the rights they seek to protect). See also 
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However, if the pharmacy in question possesses market 
power—meaning that it has few nearby competitors—granting 
an exemption to the law would seriously undermine the access to 
contraception that the law was designed to secure.  This, in turn, 
would infringe upon the practical, versus solely the expressive, 
value of the law.  Consequently, these circumstances give rise to 
a relatively stronger argument against recognizing an exemption. 
One could nevertheless fairly question the wisdom of 
denying an exemption, even under these circumstances.  For if, 
as posited, obedience to the law would require the pharmacy to 
violate certain core religious values, would not the denial of an 
exemption simply lead to the pharmacy’s closure?  How would 
that promote greater access to contraception?  And how does that 
appropriately safeguard the religious liberty interests of the 
pharmacy? 
As with all compromises, a certain level of messiness 
undeniably abounds.  It must be admitted that, by insisting upon 
compliance with the law in situations where a company possesses 
market power, this approach runs the risk of simply driving such 
companies out of business.  But without getting too far afield, 
economics would suggest that the same community that 
supported this particular pharmacy would probably be able to 
support a replacement.267
With regard to the question of religious liberty, it bears 
recognizing that as with all rights, an outer boundary must be 
drawn somewhere.  It would seem to be a reasonably fair—and 
perhaps to some, a generously fair—place to draw such a 
boundary where a putative exemption from a law of general 
applicability would do actual, material harm to a protected third-
party interest.  Indeed, such a parameter is largely in keeping 
  In other words, it stands to reason 
that there is indeed a market for a pharmacy in the community 
in question, and the departure of one should lead to the arrival of 
another. 
 
Epstein, Freedom of Association, supra note 13 (“The plea of personal 
anguish . . . from not being served carries no more weight in this context than it does 
in any other: get over it, tell your friends not to patronize the store, or write an 
angry letter to the local newspaper . . . . [But] the ultimatum to either perform 
services against conscience or go out of business causes anguish to those whose 
options in the business world are starkly limited by an intolerant majority . . . .”). 
267 See Epstein, Freedom of Association, supra note 13. 
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with the American religious liberty as traditionally understood 
by some of its most ardent advocates.268
Douglas Laycock reached a similar conclusion in a 
compromise he suggested to the issue of religious exemptions 
from laws that protect third-party interests.  In his typically 
balanced, even-handed fashion, Professor Laycock wrote: 
 
The first step [to a solution] for the religious side would be to 
focus on protecting its own liberty, and to give up on regulating 
other people’s liberty.  That is, the religious side would have to 
stop seeking legal restrictions on other people’s sex lives and 
other people’s relationships. . . . 
[T]he advocates of sexual liberty and marriage equality would 
have to agree . . . that it is far more important to protect their 
own liberty than to restrict the liberty of religious 
conservatives.  They would agree not to demand that religious 
individuals or institutions assist or facilitate practices they 
consider immoral, except—and this is an important exception—
where the goods or services requested are not available from 
another reasonably convenient provider.  Of course same-sex 
couples should have a right to marry, and to as big a wedding as 
they choose, and women should have a right to contraception, 
but apart from local monopolies, they have no real need to 
obtain those things from religious believers with deep moral 
objections.  A corollary of this solution is that Catholic hospitals 
should not seek, and should not be permitted, to acquire local 
monopolies over women’s health care.  Those who seek to live by 
their own values should avoid acquiring monopolies that block 
that same possibility for others.269
B. In Practice 
 
Implementation of an antitrust-inspired approach to 
corporate free exercise exemptions could be accomplished via a 
number of ways.  This Part sketches out the three most probable. 
1. Regulatory 
Much of the law that regulates businesses is administrative 
in nature.  Indeed, the contraceptive mandate that precipitated 
the Hobby Lobby case was exactly that: a Health and Human 
 
268 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
269 Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 839, 878–79 (2014). 
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Services regulation.270  Prior to promulgating their regulations, 
administrative agencies are ordinarily required to circulate their 
proposals for notice and comment.271  Properly conducted, this 
circulation should bring to light many—hopefully most—
potential problems that the proposed regulation would present to 
certain individuals on account of their religious beliefs and/or 
practices.  In response to this information, administrative 
agencies would be well-advised to craft religious exemptions to 
effectuate the principles outlined above.  Namely, generous 
exemptions for firms and businesses to the extent that they lack 
market power.  This is completely within their power under the 
First Amendment, as explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court 
in Employment Division v. Smith.272
2. Legislative 
 
Administrative agencies are beholden to their enabling 
legislation, and ordinarily tasked with the enforcement of certain 
laws passed by the legislatures of their jurisdictions.  As such, 
legislatures, both state and federal, could be more cognizant of 
potential conflicts between the law and religiously grounded 
businesses, and build religious exemptions, along the lines set 
forth in this article, into any newly proposed legislation. 
To the extent that RFRA and state-RFRAs are yielding 
unsatisfactory results, Congress and state legislatures could also 
consider amending these statutes.  Such amendments, with 
respect to business entities, could both strengthen the protections 
afforded to religiously grounded businesses, while at the same 
time limiting their applicability only to those businesses that 
lack market power.  Given that Burwell v. Hobby Lobby was a 
decision interpreting RFRA, and not the First Amendment per se, 
such an undertaking could effectively calibrate the Hobby Lobby 
decision as best deemed fit. 
3. Judicial 
Political will may not exist to propose new RFRAs or amend 
old RFRAs.  Further, administrative agencies may lack the 
energy or resources to take into account all of the potential 
 
270 See supra text accompanying notes 83–84. 
271 See Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative 
Law, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011). 
272 See supra text accompanying note 41. 
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religious liberty implications of the regulations they promulgate.  
Consequently, if all else fails, the judiciary could readily 
effectuate the principles outlined in this article in their rendering 
of RFRA and state-RFRAs—and even the First Amendment to 
the extent applicable. 
In all the cases appropriately brought under RFRA, as well 
as practically all the cases brought under state RFRAs, and in a 
narrow band of cases brought under the First Amendment 
itself,273 the government is put to the burden of demonstrating a 
“compelling government interest” in order to prevail in denying 
the sought-after exemption.274  In assessing whether this burden 
has been met, with regard to corporate claimants, courts could 
consider the market power of said claimants.  In other words, 
courts could factor into their analysis the degree to which a 
corporate claimant wields market power.  The greater a 
claimant’s market power, the more compelling the government’s 
interest as to that claimant if the law is one concerning access or 
antidiscrimination.275
C. Additional Considerations 
 
This article has illustrated a path forward in very broad 
strokes.  The initial decision to lump together all for-profit 
business entities under the phrase “corporate free exercise” is, 
admittedly, subject to challenge.  There are significant 
differences that characterize sole proprietorships, partnerships, 
and business corporations—differences that could very well 
impact the strength or the availability of free exercise claims.  I 
freely recognize this, and welcome further scholarship 
delineating the religious liberty claims of these entities.  
Nevertheless, the relevancy of this article’s argument persists: in 
commercial contexts, where a claimant’s free exercise claim 
would impose costs on another party, market power ought to 
factor into the exemption analysis. 
Additional fine-tuning would also be welcome with respect to 
the nature of the parties upon whom an exemption’s costs would 
fall.  More specifically, a distinction could fairly be made between 
 
273 See supra notes 35–37. 
274 See Julian Ellis & David M. Hyams, RFRA: Circuits Spit on “Compelling 
Government Interest”, 34 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 37 (2015). 
275 Of course, laws regarding public health or safety, or similar matters, should 
be enforced across the board regardless of a firm’s market power. 
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customers and employees.  Differences between these two 
disparate groups might suggest a different approach with regard 
to free exercise exemptions impacting their particular rights and 
privileges.  But again, this article’s central argument still 
applies, or at least could be applied, to free exercise claims a 
ffecting both of these groups. 
Finally, distinctions could be made among the contexts 
within which corporate free exercise exemptions might be sought.  
One important distinction would be between the “access” cases 
and the “discrimination” cases.  By “access cases” this article 
refers to the contraceptive access situation, and analogous 
situations, where a pharmacist or pharmacy refuses to fulfill 
prescriptions for contraception, or where an employer refuses to 
comply with the “contraceptive mandate” of the ACA.276  
Assuming that this refusal is applied to both male and female 
forms of contraception, it doesn’t implicate gender discrimination 
per se, but rather access to a particular good or service.277  As 
such, the “dignitary” harms implicated in other contexts are at 
their nadir in this situation.278
Moreover, it should be noted that although this article has 
focused on the “compelling government interest” prong of the free 
exercise exemption issue, an important second prong applies as 
well: that the government utilize the means least restrictive to 
an infringement upon religious liberty in pursuing its 
objective.
  All things being equal, this would 
militate in favor of granting the free exercise exemption sought. 
279
 
276 See supra notes 83–84. 
  Given that the government’s predominant objective 
in the access context is simply access to a particular good or 
service, there are certainly ways in which the government can 
provide such access without commandeering the cooperation of 
277 Oftentimes such refusals are limited to contraception that is arguably 
abortifacient in nature. As only women can conceive, such refusals admittedly blur 
the line between the “contraceptive access” category and gender discrimination. 
Although many have asserted that to be “anti-abortion” is to be “anti-woman,” the 
profound divisions that persist over the question of abortion, including divisions that 
cut across gender lines, suggest that such an assertion is at best a grossly inaccurate 
oversimplification of the issue. E.g., Thomas C. Berg, Pro-Life Progressivism and the 
Fourth Option in American Public Life, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 235, 237 (2005) 
(highlighting “pro-life feminists” such as Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 
and the organization “Feminists for Life of America, which describes itself as ‘pro-
woman, pro-life’ ”). 
278 See supra notes 257–260 and accompanying text. 
279 See supra text accompanying note 44. 
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those individuals and companies religiously opposed to this.  
Indeed, this was one of the factors that defeated the Obama 
Administration’s arguments against recognition of an exemption 
to the contraceptive mandate in Hobby Lobby.280
The other category of exemptions is those pertaining to 
antidiscrimination laws.  Here too, others have attempted to 
further categorize these situations.  Many have argued that there 
is a principled distinction between discriminating against a 
person’s status, for example his or her sexual orientation, versus 
prescinding from any involvement in that person’s conduct—such 
as his or her marriage celebration.
  It would seem, 
therefore, that within this particular context, a business’s 
religious liberty exemption claim would be strong even if it 
wielded significant market power. 
281  Others have posited that 
when it comes to discrimination, “race is different.”282
Most people can appreciate the difference between refusing 
to serve someone because of who they are and refusing to support 
or contribute to, in some way, another’s decisions or actions.  The 
latter ground of refusal resonates as more reasonable, and, 
moreover, more legitimately the subject of a proper religious 
exemption.  This argument has a distinguished pedigree, dating 
back to at least St. Augustine, who wrote “cum dilectione 
hominum et odio vitiorum,” which has been roughly translated as 
“love the sinner but hate the sin.”
  Each of 
these tempting distinctions is saddled with serious shortcomings, 
but neither is devoid of merit.  Contrary to what some contend, 
these distinctions, even if not wholly persuasive, are indeed 
rational and worthy of serious consideration.  They may serve as 
non-dispositive yet influential factors bearing upon the path 
forward. 
283
 
280 See 134 S. Ct. at 2781−82. 
  Consider whether Ms. 
Stutzman would have violated Washington’s antidiscrimination 
ordinance had she refused to sell a celebratory floral 
arrangement to a heterosexual individual whose expressed 
intention was to give the flowers to a same-sex couple on their 
281 See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 241. This argument has, admittedly, not met 
with much success in the courts. E.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 
272, 281 (Colo. App. 2015). 
282 See John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 
92 N.C. L. REV. 787, 837–42 (2014). 
283 Cum dilectione hominum et odio vitiorum, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
QUOTATIONS 37 (4th ed. 1992). 
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wedding day.  If this would not constitute a violation, the law 
would seem to countenance St, Augustine’s aforementioned 
distinction.  If, on the other hand, this would constitute a 
violation, the law would seem to be punishing individuals for 
their beliefs per se—as in the hypothetical, the refusal is made to 
an individual who does not fall within a protected class. 
But two difficulties interpose themselves.  First, the status-
conduct distinction, if pushed too hard, tends to break down—
especially with regard to the context of same-sex marriage.  The 
line between not serving an individual because of his or her 
sexual orientation (status), versus his or her spousal choice 
(conduct), is, admittedly, a thin one. 
Second, there is also the problem of suggesting that certain 
objections are “properly” religious, such as those pertaining to 
conduct, and that some are not, such as those pertaining to 
status.  Although this may comport with the understanding of 
religion shared by most, the entire point of religious liberty 
exemptions is to protect those whose religious beliefs are not 
within the mainstream. 
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the distinction 
between status and conduct ought not be completely abandoned.  
Sophistry must be avoided.  The recognition of religious 
exemptions, both in the judicial crafting thereof, but especially 
when they are created as an accommodation via legislative or 
regulatory action, is all about line-drawing.  It is not wrongful to 
employ rules of thumb, as rough as they may be, as factors to be 
considered.  In short, it is not unprincipled, in recognizing an 
exemption, to weigh differently an exemption that would 
sanction discrimination obviously predicated upon status alone 
versus an exemption that can more fairly be ascribed as 
pertaining to conduct. 
A similar line of reasoning justifies the “race is different” 
distinction.  Slavery, the Civil War, three constitutional 
amendments, and state-enforced segregation all combine to 
attest to a uniquely problematic history of racial discrimination 
that is, arguably, different in kind than all other forms of 
discrimination in America.  As such, it would not be indefensible, 
in crafting religious exemptions to antidiscrimination laws, to 
treat antidiscrimination laws relating to race differently from 
those relating to other characteristics. 
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Finally, it should not be denied that, today at least, the 
controversy over LGBT antidiscrimination laws, when applied to 
the context of marriage, implicates religious conscience to a 
degree that other antidiscrimination laws do not.  Indeed, 
exceedingly few individuals today advance religious arguments to 
justify most other forms of discrimination, whereas large 
numbers of individuals do indeed advance religious arguments in 
opposition to marriage arrangements other than one man, one 
woman. 
Of course, apparently genuine religious arguments have 
been historically raised to justify all sorts of discriminatory 
atrocities, ranging from slavery to the Jim Crow laws.284  As 
someone with more than a passing familiarity with the Bible, 
and who believes that some interpretations thereof are 
objectively strong while others are objectively weak, I admittedly 
have difficulty understanding how some have used the Bible to 
justify racism, and how those justifications could be deemed 
credible by anyone.  For example, the “dangers of miscegenation” 
purportedly received support from Genesis, where “the serpent 
was in fact a metaphor for a ‘pre-Adamite . . . negro gardener’ 
who had tempted and, presumably, penetrated Eve.”285  Really?  
To somehow equate that interpretation to, for example, the 
biblical exegesis and philosophical thought of Pope Benedict XVI 
on marriage286
In response, many would be quick to suggest that in years to 
come, religious arguments concerning marriage will appear as 
frivolous and pretextual in retrospect as do the religious 
objections to desegregation or miscegenation in our own time.  
Indeed, there are those who assert that the religious arguments 
against same-sex marriage are frivolous and pretextual 
already.
 is, I suggest, ludicrous.  Put differently, just 
because someone says the Bible says something, doesn’t make it 
so. 
287
 
284 See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often 
Conflates Status, Belief, and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. 
REV. 657, 678–79 (2011). 
  But that is, of course, not a foregone conclusion.  
Moreover, it is certainly not the situation today. 
285 Gilreath & Ward, supra note 241, at 262–63. 
286 See generally BENEDICT XVI, ADDRESS OF HIS HOLINESS BENEDICT XVI ON 
THE OCCASION OF CHRISTMAS GREETINGS TO THE ROMAN CURIA (2012). 
287 See Gilreath & Ward, supra note 241, at 258–67. 
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On the one hand, none of this matters.  For, as mentioned 
previously, religious liberty exemptions are necessary precisely 
when one’s religious beliefs are idiosyncratic and lack sufficient 
public support to be otherwise protected.  On the other hand, 
however, it’s not sensible to turn a blind eye to the realities of our 
current situation.   
Whatever the past has held, and whatever the future may 
hold, in our own time a critical mass of people, otherwise devoid 
of any hint of malice or homophobia, have stepped forward and 
voiced serious objection to same-sex marriage—an objection so 
deep that, as merchants and businesspeople, they refuse to 
provide goods or services to same-sex wedding celebrations.  
Although there are those who would demonize these fellow 
citizens, for reasons already addressed such demonization is both 
unfair and ignorant.288  In short, there is a qualitative difference 
between the 21st century racist and the 21st century opponent to 
same-sex marriage.  It is likely that this difference does not hold 
with regard to every individual in each of these two camps.  But 
as the example of Barronelle Stutzman makes clear, this 
difference certainly holds for some.289
CONCLUSION 
  Courts, legislatures, and 
administrative agencies should not ignore the reality of this 
phenomenon in its evaluation of religious liberty exemption 
claims.  Indeed, the phenomenon of persistent opposition to 
involvement in same-sex weddings by individuals of apparent 
good will and otherwise devoid of prejudice should rightfully be 
considered as an important factor in evaluating the promulgation 
of exemptions in the context of antidiscrimination laws as 
applied to same-sex weddings. 
This article posits a way of utilizing the insights of antitrust 
law to help resolve the seemingly intractable dilemma of 
corporate religious liberty exemptions. 
Admittedly, it’s not intractable to everyone.  To some, 
corporate religious liberty rights ought to be coextensive with 
individual religious liberty rights.290
 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 233−245; see also supra note 242. 
  To others, as marketplace 
289 See supra text accompanying notes 233−245. 
290 See Mark Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is there Religious Liberty for 
Moneymakers? 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 116 (2013). 
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participants, businesses and companies are held to standards 
that differ from that of individuals, making them justly subject to 
laws and regulations that private persons are not.291
But to others still, and perhaps the smallest category of 
commentators of all, some middle path must be forged: a path 
respectful of both the genuine religious liberty concerns that 
undergird corporate religious liberty and of protecting those 
rights and privileges that society has deemed worthy of 
protection.  With this contribution, I lend my voice and reasoning 
to this category of commentators.  In a society that truly 
cherishes the pluralism and diversity that it purports to, a simple 
one-size-fits-all approach that bulldozes all in its way is 
inappropriate and unjustifiable. 
 
Unfortunately, the will to find some common ground in this 
area seems to be lessoning.  In his rightly acclaimed book 
“Reclaiming Hope,” Michael Wear, director of Barack Obama’s 
faith efforts and staff member of the Obama Administration’s 
Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, observed 
how, from his vantage point, the appetite for compromise and a 
genuine embrace of diversity had diminished over the course of 
four short years.292
In 2009, our diversity demanded we accept that there will be 
voices we disagree with in public places.  In 2013, diversity 
required us to expel dissent . . . . In 2009, we had true pluralism 
and the big American tent.  In 2012, at the Democratic 
convention, we had a pretense of inclusion and magnanimity for 
political gain.  In 2013, with our last four years in hand and the 
“weight of history on our side” that pretense went out the 
window.
  Comparing Obama’s 2009 inauguration 
versus his 2013 inauguration, Wear commented: 
293
Such an attitude does not bode well for those whose beliefs fail to 
garner the support of governing majorities. 
 
 
291 See James M. Oleske, Jr., The Public Meaning of RFRA versus Legislators’ 
Understanding of RLPA: A Response to Professor Laycock, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 125, 131–34 (2014). 
292 MICHAEL R. WEAR, RECLAIMING HOPE: LESSONS LEARNED IN THE OBAMA 
WHITE HOUSE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF FAITH IN AMERICA 187–188 (2017). 
293 Id. at 188. Wear contrasted these attitudes to those of years earlier still: 
“When George W. Bush was campaigning for a federal marriage amendment, he did 
not campaign to revoke the tax status of the Episcopal Church [which had condoned 
same-sex marriage] because its views on marriage were ‘fundamentally un-
American.’ ” Id. at 223. 
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Sun Tzu famously warned against driving one’s opponent 
into a corner,294 and the government’s unnecessarily heavy-
handed approach to pushing a particular social agenda over the 
last several years may be doing exactly that.295
 
  Although this 
may ultimately break the backs of mere bigots, it is unlikely to 
coerce into submission those individuals whose opposition arises 
from genuine religious conscience.  For genuine religious 
conscience is the stuff of which martyrs are made—not to 
mention civil unrest and, historically, armed conflict.  America’s 
Founding Fathers were well aware of this, and recognized the 
practical as well as the moral imperative to protect religious 
conscious to the widest degree possible.  As in so many matters, 
we would do well to heed their wisdom and avoid forcing sincere 
religious believers to choose between their livelihoods and 
obedience to the law. 
 
294 See SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 120–21 (Lionel Giles trans., Luzac & Co. 
1910) (5th c. B.C.). 
295 See Oleske, Jr., supra note 291, at 131–32; see generally Eskridge Jr., supra 
note 284, at 657, 678–79, 719–20. 
